The First Sale Doctrine and the Economics of Post-Sale Restraints by Katz, Ariel
BYU Law Review
Volume 2014 | Issue 1 Article 4
4-30-2014
The First Sale Doctrine and the Economics of Post-
Sale Restraints
Ariel Katz
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview
Part of the Intellectual Property Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Brigham Young University Law Review at BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in BYU Law Review by an authorized editor of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Ariel Katz, The First Sale Doctrine and the Economics of Post-Sale Restraints, 2014 BYU L. Rev. 55 (2014).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview/vol2014/iss1/4
DO NOT DELETE 5/5/2014 3:43 PM 
 
55 
The First Sale Doctrine and the Economics of Post-
Sale Restraints 
Ariel Katz* 
 
ABSTRACT 
The first sale doctrine limits the exclusive rights that survive the 
initial authorized sale of an item protected by intellectual property 
(IP) rights, and therefore limits the ability of IP owners to impose 
post-sale restraints on the distribution or use of items embodying 
their IP. While the doctrine has deep common law and statutory 
roots, its exact rationale and scope have never been fully explored 
and articulated. As a result, the law remains somewhat unsettled, in 
particular with respect to the ability of IP owners to opt-out of the 
doctrine and with respect to the applicability of the doctrine to 
situations of parallel importation. This Article provides answers to 
these unsettled issues. By applying insights from the economics of 
post-sale restraints, the Article shows that the main benefits of post-
sale restraints involve situations of imperfect vertical integration 
between coproducing or collaborating firms, which occur during the 
production and distribution phases or shortly thereafter. In such 
situations, opting out of the first sale doctrine should be permitted. 
Beyond such limited circumstances, however, the first sale doctrine 
promotes important social and economic goals: it promotes efficient 
long-term use and preservation of goods embodying IP and 
 
* Associate Professor, Innovation Chair–Electronic Commerce, Faculty of Law, University of 
Toronto. This Article is based on a paper given at the Exhaustion and First Sale in IP 
Symposium, High Tech Law Institute, Santa Clara Law School, Nov. 5, 2010, at the 2011 
Intellectual Property Scholars Conference, and the 2012 Next Generation of Antitrust 
Scholarship Conference. I wish to thank Eric Goldman, Mark Lemley, Mark McKenna, Anne 
Layne-Farrar, Mark Patterson, Steven Edwards, and other symposium participants for their 
valuable comments and insights, as well as to thank Norman Siebrasse, and my colleagues 
Peggy Radin, Abraham Drassinower, Ed Iacobucci, and Michael Trebilcock for their advice. 
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facilitates user-innovation. Therefore, contrary to some other views, I 
conclude that the economics of post-sale restraints confirm the 
validity and support the continued vitality of the first sale doctrine. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The first sale doctrine in copyright law, also known as the 
exhaustion rule of intellectual property (IP) rights, limits the power 
of IP owners to control the downstream distribution and use of their 
products or copies of their products that bear their trademark or 
embody their invention or work. When such rules apply, the patent 
owner’s right to sell a product embodying the invention,1 the 
copyright owner’s right to distribute copies of her work,2 or the 
trademark owner’s right to sell products bearing the trademark3 are 
terminated after the first authorized sale of the genuine product or 
work. As a result, any subsequent sale, rental,4 or other disposition of 
ownership or possession (and in the case of patents, use of the 
patented invention)5 does not require the authorization of the owner 
of the IP right. 
Occasionally, intellectual property owners have wished to exert 
greater control over the downstream distribution or use of their 
works and products and have looked for ways to work around the 
 
 1. Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. §§ 1–376 (2010). 
 2. Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–1332 (2010). 
 3. Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1141 (2010). 
 4. Software and sound recordings are exceptions to this rule. Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. 
§ 109; Computer Software Rental Amendments Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101–650, 104 Stat 
5089 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 109 (1994)). 
 5. In addition to making, offering for sale, and selling the patented invention, the 
Patent Act grants the patentee an exclusive right to “use” the patented invention. 35 U.S.C. 
§ 154 (2010). Copyrights or trademarks do not confer such general exclusive right to “use.” 
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first sale doctrine using both technological and legal means, or to 
limit its scope by statutes. So far, these attempts have been only 
partially successful, resulting in a set of incomplete, and often 
incoherent and confusing, rules and exceptions. The Copyright Act, 
for example, contains ambiguous language with regard to the 
application of the doctrine to copies that were made outside the 
United States. This ambiguity has required the Supreme Court to 
hear three cases within the last fifteen years until the Court, in a 
divided decision, resolved that the doctrine does not discriminate 
between copies that were made in the United States and those that 
were made abroad.6 The statutory language has also been interpreted 
as confining the application of the doctrine only to copies that are 
“owned” rather than “licensed,”7 or to render the doctrine 
inapplicable to the resale of digital copies apart from the resale of the 
particular medium in which they are embedded.8 The language is 
also silent about the doctrine’s effect on contractual workarounds 
between owners and users and the effect of such contracts on third-
party purchasers. In patent law, even though the statutory language 
is simpler,9 courts still grapple with defining the exact scope of 
exhaustion, and the Court has refrained from expressing an opinion 
on the validity of contractual workarounds.10 With the increasing 
 
 6. Quality King Distribs., Inc. v. L’anza Res. Int’l, Inc., 523 U.S. 135, 154 (1998) 
(Ginsburg, J., concurring) (concurring on the basis that the imported copies were made in the 
United States); Costco v. Omega, 541 F.3d 982 (9th Cir. 2008), affm’d by an equally divided 
court, 131 S. Ct. 565 (2010) (holding that the first sale doctrine applies only to copies made in 
the United States); Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1351, 1357–71 (2013) 
(holding that the first sale doctrine is not limited to copies lawfully made in the United States and 
equally applies to copies of a copyrighted work lawfully made abroad). 
 7. Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 621 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 8. Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi Inc., 934 F. Supp. 2d 640 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
 9. The Patent Act unambiguously grants an exclusive right to make, use, or sell the 
invention, and exhaustion rules, developed by the courts, have never been codified. Somewhat 
paradoxically, the lack of codification saves courts from the need to grapple with ambiguous 
language such as that of the Copyright Act. 
 10. Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617 (2008) (leaving 
unanswered the question of contracting around the exhaustion doctrine, and noting that “the 
authorized nature of the sale to Quanta does not necessarily limit LGE’s other contract rights. 
LGE’s complaint does not include a breach-of-contract claim, and we express no opinion on 
whether contract damages might be available even though exhaustion operates to eliminate 
patent damages”). Id. at 637. See also Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 
243 U.S. 502 (1917) (“The extent to which the use of the patented machine may validly be 
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ease of movement of both software and hard goods around the 
world, this ambiguity impacts on a global level.11 
Recently, and perhaps counterintuitively, some antitrust scholars 
and other commentators have argued that the economics of post-sale 
restraints provide a robust theoretical foundation for undermining 
exhaustion rules or at least narrowing their scope, suggesting that 
just as antitrust law has relaxed its previous animosity towards post-
sale restraints, IP law should embrace them as well.12 
In this Article, I argue that the economics of post-sale restraints 
do not support the case against exhaustion rules. While these insights 
can help fill some of the doctrine’s missing theoretical foundations 
and assist in drawing its proper contours, they do not support the 
case against the first sale doctrine. Instead, these insights ultimately 
support the doctrine’s validity and continued vitality. This Article 
shows that the economic literature teaches us that (a) the doctrine 
should not be relied on to automatically invalidate short-term 
contractual post-sale restraints, and (b) that the law might actually 
uphold such contracts when they are entered into between 
collaborating and non-integrated firms when they are necessary to 
encourage investment and control opportunism.13 But the Article 
also shows that the economic literature also teaches us that firms 
 
restricted to specific supplies or otherwise by special contract between the owner of a patent 
and the purchaser or licensee is a question outside the patent law, and with it we are not here 
concerned.”) Id. at 509. 
 11. See, e.g., Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPS”), 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 
U.N.T.S. 154, Annex 1C, art. 6 (agreement to disagree on the issue of exhaustion); Euro-
Excellence Inc. v. Kraft Canada Inc., [2007] 3 S.C.R. 20 (Can.). Abraham Drassinower writes 
that the Euro-Excellence case “regales us not with one or two, but with nothing less than four 
different judgments . . . . The effect of these overlapping yet distinct and concurring 
judgments, which both partially agree and partially disagree with each other in multiple 
respects, is that, aside from the relatively easy statement that the defendant parallel importer 
won the case, it is difficult to identify with clarity or conviction what the law of parallel imports 
of copyrighted works is in Canada.” Abraham Drassinower, The Art of Selling Chocolate: 
Remarks on Copyright’s Domain, in FROM “RADICAL EXTREMISM” TO “BALANCED 
COPYRIGHT”: CANADIAN COPYRIGHT AND THE DIGITAL AGENDA 121, 122 (Michael Geist 
ed., 2010). 
 12. See, e.g., The First Sale Doctrine, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY COLLOQUIUM (Mar. 
2010), http://www.ipcolloquium.com/Programs/12.html (discussing the first sale doctrine 
and comparing copyright’s approach to that of antitrust law). 
 13. See infra Part VI. 
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tend to consider the short term but discount the long term, and that 
in calculating the costs and benefits of their activities, they consider 
only their own private costs and benefits, but not those external to 
them.14 Such externalities and other market imperfections strongly 
imply that even when IP owners seek to impose post-sale restraints 
for economically justified reasons, the nature, scope, and duration of 
those restraints would be socially suboptimal. Thus, the first sale 
doctrine permits IP owners to implement and enforce some post-sale 
restraints when they are most likely to be beneficial—during the 
production or initial distribution stages of their products—but 
otherwise guarantees that the use and reuse of such products would 
not be burdened with excessive and unnecessary restraints. Taken 
seriously, these economic insights suggest that the doctrine should 
remain a sticky default property rule in most other circumstances. 
This Article focuses on the first sale doctrine in copyright law, 
but most of the analysis is applicable to other IP rights.15 The Article 
is organized as follows: Part II describes different existing and 
possible formulations of the first sale doctrine to set the stage for the 
discussion that follows. Part III briefly traces the origin of the first 
sale doctrine in copyright law and reminds us of the role that 
unexhausted IP rights can play in facilitating anticompetitive 
practices such as industry-wide cartels; Part IV describes how 
modern antitrust law treats vertical restraints and how this view can 
inform the debate surrounding the first sale doctrine. The Article 
then discusses how careless application of the insights derived from 
modern antitrust law and economics has misinformed several 
debates. Parts V discusses the misapplication of these insights in the 
context of parallel trade, Part VI criticizes the insufficient attention 
the distinction between property rights and those arising out of 
contracts, and Part VII shows more generally how a hurried 
application of the Coase theorem misinforms many of these and 
related debates. Part VIII considers the continuing vitality of the 
 
 14. See infra Part VII. 
 15. Indeed, since the first sale doctrine is merely a manifestation of “a common-law 
doctrine with an impeccable historic pedigree,” Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 133 S. 
Ct. 1351, 1363 (2013) , the analysis can apply even more broadly to all restraints on alienation 
of property, whether or not IP rights are involved. 
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doctrine; and Part IX revisits several recent cases in light of the 
insights of this Article. 
II. THE FIRST SALE DOCTRINE: DIFFERENT FORMULATIONS 
Part of the difficulty in the debate about the first sale doctrine is 
the fact that its rationale has never been fully articulated, nor have its 
boundaries been made clear. Unfortunately, despite more than a 
hundred years of litigation, many questions linger on, without clear 
or satisfactory answers. Moreover, even when the doctrine applies, it 
may be unclear how strong it is, that is, whether the first sale 
doctrine is a mandatory rule or merely a default rule, and if it is a 
default rule, how sticky the default rule is. In order to begin 
answering these questions, it may be useful to recognize that there 
might be at least five possible formulations of the doctrine based on 
perceived strength. 
A. No First Sale Doctrine 
At one end of the spectrum lies the option of no first sale 
doctrine, meaning that it is up to the IP owner to decide whether 
the first-authorized sale or any subsequent sale would exhaust the IP 
right. I include this option on the spectrum not merely for the 
elegance of the model, but also because in some instances this is (or 
might be) the law. For example, if, as the Ninth Circuit held in 
Vernor,16 the doctrine does not apply when a software publisher 
chooses to characterize a transaction as a license rather than a sale, 
then every subsequent sale or disposition of the copy requires the 
copyright owner’s permission. If, as the district court held in 
ReDigi,17 the first sale doctrine does not apply to digital copies 
resold apart from the particular medium in which they are 
embedded, then a large and growing swath of markets for digitally 
distributed works continue to be under the constant control of 
copyright owners. And had the dissent in Kirtsaeng had its way, the 
first sale doctrine would apply only to copies made in the United 
States, but not to copies made abroad.18 Had this been the case, 
 
 16. Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 621 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 17. Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi Inc., 934 F. Supp. 2d 640 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
 18. Kirtsaeng, 133 S. Ct. at 1376 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Quality King Distribs., Inc. 
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copyright owners could avoid the first sale doctrine by locating 
production offshore,19 meaning that the copyright owner could 
effectively dictate whether the doctrine applies or not. 
B. Weak First Sale Doctrine 
A weak formulation views the first sale doctrine as a simple 
default rule: the IP owner’s exclusive right is exhausted after the first 
unconditional sale. However, it may not be exhausted if the 
transaction is conditional and conditions were imposed by license, 
contract, or, possibly, even mere notice. Breach of any such 
conditions (by a contracting party, a licensee, or a purchaser who 
had notice of the restriction) would trigger liability for infringement, 
subject to antitrust scrutiny or an antitrust-based IP misuse defense, 
placing the burden of showing an anticompetitive effect or misuse on 
the person who challenges the restraint.20 
C. Moderate First Sale Doctrine 
Under a moderate first sale doctrine the first authorized sale still 
exhausts the IP right but the buyer may still be bound by contractual 
post-sale restraints. Under this reading, contractual post-sale 
restraints are valid (subject to general antitrust or misuse scrutiny), 
yet their breach may trigger liability only for breach of contract, 
rather than for IP infringement. The consequences are that only 
weaker remedies for breach contract but not the stronger IP 
remedies will be available, and that those remedies will be available 
against a narrower set of parties (those privy to the contract, but 
not others).21 
 
v. L’anza Res. Int’l, Inc., 523 U.S. 135, 154 (1998) (Ginsburg, J., concurring); see also BMG 
Music v. Perez, 952 F.2d 318 (9th Cir. 1991). 
 19. But see Parfums Givenchy, Inc. v. Drug Emporium, Inc., 38 F.3d 477, 481 (9th Cir. 
1994) (holding that the while the first sale doctrine does not apply to copies made outside the 
United States, it does apply upon the first authorized sale of those copies in the United States). 
 20. See, e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp, Post-Sale Restraints and Competitive Harm: The First 
Sale Doctrine in Perspective, 66 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 487, 541 (2010). 
 21. This was the position of the United States in its Amicus Brief in Quanta Computer, 
Inc. v. LG Electronics. See Brief of Amicus Curiae United States in Support of Petitioners, 
Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., 553 U.S. 617 (2008) (No. 06-937), 2007 WL 
3353102, at *29 (“Some of the same restrictions that the first sale doctrine renders ineffective 
in a patent-infringement suit could be validly imposed as a matter of state contract law. But 
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D. Strong First Sale Doctrine 
A strong formulation of the rule treats the first sale doctrine as a 
sticky default rule de jure.22 This means that the first authorized sale 
exhausting the IP rights and attempting to work around exhaustion 
rules would be invalidated in the absence of a compelling case-
specific explanation as to why the work around should be upheld. 
Procedurally, this formulation may translate into a rebuttable 
presumption of invalidity attached to attempts to work around the 
doctrine. The strength of such a presumption (or the ease of 
rebutting it) may evolve as, through adjudication, the case law may 
develop categories of cases of more or less permissible 
work-arounds.23 
E. Strongest First Sale Doctrine 
Under the strongest formulation of the first sale doctrine, the 
sale exhausts the right, and attempts to work around the doctrine 
would be preempted, held invalid, may constitute IP misuse per se 
(i.e., without any inquiry into whether working around the doctrine 
can be justified),24 or, at the extreme, trigger antitrust liability. 
With these different possible formulations in mind, let me turn 
to discussing the origins of the doctrine and how the insights from 
modern antitrust law and the thinking about the economics of post-
sale restraints help in choosing the right formulation. 
 
 
even otherwise valid contract provisions would not provide a defense to a federal antitrust 
action, and mere unilateral notice to downstream purchasers will not generally give rise to 
enforceable contractual restrictions.”). 
 22. On sticky default rules, see generally Cass R. Sunstein, Switching the Default Rule, 
77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 106 (2002). While default rules often tend to be sticky, for the reason 
discussed in Part VII below, the first sale doctrine may not be a sticky default unless its 
stickiness is bolstered legally. 
 23. This can be analogous to how the scope of fair use in copyright law develops, see 
Peter DiCola & Matthew Sag, An Information-Gathering Approach to Copyright Policy, 34 
CARD. L. REV. 173 (2012), or to how antitrust jurisprudence moves between rule of reason 
and per se rules. 
 24. See Omega S.A. v. Costco Wholesale Corp., No. CV04-05443TJH, 2011 WL 
8492716 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 9, 2011) (holding that Omega’s attempt to prevent parallel 
importation of noncopyrightable watches by suing the importer for unlawfully importing the 
copyrighted company logo embedded in the back of the watch constituted copyright misuse). 
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III. THE ORIGINS 
Bobbs-Merrill v. Straus25 is often considered to be the grand entry 
of the first sale doctrine into American copyright law. A similar 
principle of exhaustion in patent law was reconfirmed shortly 
thereafter.26 But like many legal rules, its genesis can be traced to 
more than a single source or event. As others have noted, the first 
sale doctrine emerged from an era in which IP rights were more 
modest in scope27 and greater regard was given to their limited 
nature.28 One could argue that it was formed in a more formalist era 
when legal thinking and reasoning tended to appreciate the 
distinction between legal categories and were averse to blurring the 
lines between them. 
However, the main legal streams that gave rise to the first sale 
doctrine were the common law hostility to restraints on alienation, 
to servitudes in general, and servitudes in chattels in particular, and 
the emergence of antitrust law and its contemporaneous hostility 
towards both horizontal and vertical restraints.29 Both of these 
streams have gone through substantive transformation over time. 
The common law’s aversion to servitudes has waned, and antitrust 
law, influenced by modern antitrust scholarship, has not only relaxed 
its hostility toward vertical restraints, but in some cases has grown to 
 
 25. Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339 (1908). 
 26. See Bauer & Cie. v. O’Donnell, 229 U.S. 1 (1913); Motion Picture Patents Co. v. 
Universal Film Mfg., 243 U.S. 502 (1917); see also Katherine J. Strandburg, Users as 
Innovators: Implications for Patent Doctrine, 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 467, 495 (2008) (“The first 
sale doctrine holds that a patentee’s rights are ‘exhausted’ when a patented product is sold, 
leaving the purchaser free to do with it as he or she wishes.”). 
 27. See, e.g., Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 
YALE L.J. 283, 294 (1996) (characterizing modern copyright law as “bloated”); see also Lionel 
Bentley, R. v The Author: From Death Penalty to Community Service, 32 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 
1, 3 (2008) (describing the consensus among academic about the expansion of copyright). 
 28. Bobbs-Merrill, 210 U.S. at 346 (“The copyright statutes ought to be reasonably 
construed, with a view to effecting the purposes intended by Congress. They ought not to be 
unduly extended by judicial construction to include privileges not intended to be conferred, 
nor so narrowly construed as to deprive those entitled to their benefit of the rights Congress 
intended to grant.”); see also Motion Picture Patents, 243 U.S. at 510. 
 29. Hovenkamp, supra note 20, at 504 (“Over history, most of the Supreme Court’s 
decisions on the first sale doctrine have attached its rationale to competition policy. . . . 
Lacking a rationale for explaining why vertical restrictions were anticompetitive in the 
traditional sense of leading to reduced output and higher prices, antitrust itself imported from 
the first sale doctrine the common law’s concern with restraints on alienation.”). 
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embrace them enthusiastically. Some may argue that just as the 
confluence of property law and antitrust gave rise to the first sale 
doctrine, a new confluence of these streams flowing in the reverse 
direction will lead to its demise. 
A. The Antitrust Legacy of Bobbs-Merrill 
Bobbs-Merrill v. Straus, decided in 1908, is often described in 
antitrust literature as a resale price maintenance (RPM) case,30 
namely, an attempt by a manufacturer (a publisher) to maintain the 
resale price of her product (a book). Bobbs-Merrill was the publisher 
of a novel titled The Castaway by Hallie Ermine Rives.31 A notice 
printed on the book prohibited anyone from reselling it for less than 
$1 and threatened to treat any violation of this condition as 
copyright infringement. Macy’s, then a discount department store, 
purchased copies of the book from a distributor and sold them for 
eighty-nine cents each.32 Bobbs-Merrill sued for copyright 
infringement. The Supreme Court dismissed the action, holding that 
the publisher’s exclusive right to sell copies does not give it the 
power to “qualify the title of a future purchaser . . . . To add to the 
right of exclusive sale the authority to control all future retail sales, 
by a notice that such sales must be made at a fixed sum, would give a 
right not included in the terms of the statute, and, in our view, 
extend its operation, by construction, beyond its meaning, when 
interpreted with a view to ascertaining the legislative intent in 
its enactment.”33 
Strictly speaking, Bobbs-Merrill was not an antitrust case. Bobbs-
Merrill sued for copyright infringement, and the Court’s decision 
focused on the scope of a copyright owner’s exclusive right to vend 
copies.34 However, antitrust scholarship often treats the decision as a 
reflection of the Court’s contemporaneous hostility to all types of 
post-sale restraints, whether based in property (and intellectual 
 
 30. Id. at 497; see also KEITH N. HYLTON, ANTITRUST LAW: ECONOMIC THEORY AND 
COMMON LAW EVOLUTION 261 (2003). 
 31. HALLIE ERMINE RIVES, THE CASTAWAY (1904). 
 32. Bobbs-Merrill, 210 U.S. at 340–42. 
 33. Id. at 351. 
 34. Id. 
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property) rights or in contract.35 Indeed, three years after Bobbs-
Merrill, the Court expressed similar hostility, this time as a matter of 
antitrust law, when it held in Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & 
Sons Co.36 that resale price maintenance was illegal per se under the 
antitrust laws.37 According to Hovenkamp, this trend culminated in a 
duo of cases, Straus v. Victor Talking Machine and the Motion 
Picture Patents case, both issued on the same day in April 1917, 
which effectively created a merger between the first sale doctrine and 
antitrust policy.38 
Viewed from this perspective, the first sale doctrine and antitrust 
law’s treatment of vertical restraints are nothing but two sides of the 
same coin. One reflects aversion to relying on IP rights to impose 
such restraints, the other manifests hostility to instituting them by 
contract. If so, then change in the law’s attitude towards one side of 
the coin might appear necessarily to require change in the other. The 
shortcomings of this logic will be discussed in greater length in Parts 
VI and VII. At this point, however, it will be worthwhile to consider 
a less known aspect of Bobbs-Merrill’s antitrust history, because the 
lessons from this unfamiliar story will also be relevant for 
appreciating the merits of the first sale doctrine and the perils of 
abandoning it. 
The Court’s decision in the Bobbs-Merrill case ends with a 
remark explaining that in light of the Court’s conclusion to dismiss 
the copyright infringement claim, “it [is] unnecessary to discuss 
other questions noticed in the opinion in the circuit court of appeals, 
or to examine into the validity of the publisher’s agreements, alleged 
to be in violation of the acts to restrain combinations creating a 
monopoly or directly tending to the restraint of trade.”39 
This single allusion to antitrust opens the door to a much richer 
antitrust history discussed in the lower courts’ decision. It turns out 
that the dispute in Bobbs-Merrill did not involve a single publisher 
 
 35. Hovenkamp, supra note 20, at 503–10. 
 36. Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911). 
 37. Id. at 408, overruled by Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 
U.S. 877 (2007) (holding that resale price maintenance is subject to rule of reason analysis 
rather than per se illegality). 
 38. Hovenkamp, supra note 20, at 508. 
 39. Bobbs-Merrill, 210 U.S. at 351. 
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desiring to exercise control over the distribution system of its books. 
Rather, the case concerned an industry-wide cartel established in 
1900 comprising the majority of book publishers and booksellers 
who conspired to “correct some of the evils connected with the 
cutting of prices on copyright books” by requiring all publishers to 
fix the retail prices of their respective books to prevent discounting 
and eliminate discounters by collectively refusing to deal with 
them.40 RPM was the means to enforce the cartel, and copyright was 
an effective method to enforce the RPM. 
In fact, as early as 1903, Macy’s attempted to enjoin the cartel by 
suing the American Publishers’ Association and the American 
Booksellers’ Association under the New York Anti-Monopoly Act.41 
Macy’s bid was only partially successful. The New York Court of 
Appeals found in favor of Macy’s on the basis that the publishers’ 
and booksellers’ rules sought to prevent the discounting of all books, 
copyrighted and noncopyrighted alike.42 Relying on Bement v. 
National Harrow,43 however, the court held that a combination to 
fix the prices of copyrighted books alone would be legal. Soon 
thereafter, the respective associations’ rules were amended to cover 
copyrighted books only,44 and Bobbs-Merrill commenced its 
copyright infringement suit against Macy’s. In its defense, Macy’s 
argued that the notice included in the book, which was lawfully 
printed and sold, could not restrict the right of the book’s owner to 
resell it as the owner saw fit. Macy’s further defended on the grounds 
that the lawsuit was an attempt to enforce an unlawful 
combination.45 The Circuit Court sided with Macy’s on both issues 
 
 40. Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 139 F. 155, 157 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1905), aff’d, 147 F. 
15 (2d Cir. 1906), aff’d, 210 U.S. 339 (1908). 
 41. Straus v. Am. Publishers’ Ass’n, 69 N.E. 1107 (N.Y. 1904). 
 42. Id. at 477–81. 
 43. E. Bement & Sons v. Nat’l Harrow Co., 186 U.S. 70, 91 (1902) (“[T]he general rule 
is absolute freedom in the use or sale of rights under the patent laws of the United States. The 
very object of these laws is monopoly, and the rule is, with few exceptions, that any conditions 
which are not in their very nature illegal with regard to this kind of property, imposed by the 
patentee and agreed to by the licensee for the right to manufacture or use or sell the article, will 
be upheld by the courts. The fact that the conditions in the contracts keep up the monopoly or 
fix prices does not render them illegal.”). 
 44. Bobbs-Merrill, 139 F. at 172. 
 45. Id. at 156. 
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and refused to construe Bement v. National Harrow as broadly as the 
state court did.46 On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed, but 
addressed only the copyright question.47 The Supreme Court, as 
noted above, mentioned the antitrust issue only in passing and based 
its decision solely on copyright grounds. 
This antitrust history of Bobbs-Merrill illustrates an important 
lesson about the merits of the first sale doctrine and the perils of 
abandoning it: there is an important difference between obligations 
enforced as property and those that could be enforced only by 
contract; the relative strength of property entitlements over 
contractual ones may be an advantage when they promote socially 
beneficial goals but a serious problem when they can be relied on to 
enforce harmful practices. It is well known that while cartels can be 
highly beneficial to their members (and detrimental to consumers), 
they are unstable because each of their members can do even better 
by cheating. In order to be sustainable, cartel members need to be 
able to monitor cheating and enforce adherence to cartel rules, and it 
has been well documented that RPM can be an effective means to 
enforce cartels; if retail prices are fixed, cheating may be easily 
monitored and the colluding firms may demand that the deviant 
retailer be disciplined.48 
While cartels may employ contractual RPM to stabilize or 
enforce their rules, the utility of RPM is limited because it depends on 
the ability to enforce the contractual obligation, and the obligation 
will not be binding on third parties. Bobbs-Merrill is a case on point. 
Macy’s was not a party to the price fixing agreements and therefore 
was not bound by them. Even though it had been blacklisted by the 
publisher/bookseller cartel for being a price-cutter, Macy’s still 
managed to procure copies of the book and offer them for sale at a 
lower price. The copyright infringement claim, then, was designed to 
 
 46. Id. at 193. 
 47. Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 147 F. 15 (2d Cir. 1906). 
 48. See Ittai Paldor, The Vertical Restraints Paradox, 58 U. TORONTO L.J. 317, 328 
(2008); see also Edward Iacobucci, The Case for Prohibiting Resale Price Maintenance, 19 
WORLD COMP. L. & ECON. REV. 71 (1995). 
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force Macy’s to comply with the cartel’s rules, by purporting to 
enforce those terms against a third party.49 
The Supreme Court’s holding on copyright grounds destabilized 
the cartel because it meant that Macy’s could, as a matter of law, 
continue to cut prices. Therefore, it could be argued that the kind of 
problem that the Court faced in Bobbs-Merrill hardly justifies the first 
sale doctrine because if the problem were an underlying cartel, 
antitrust law would have no problem condemning it. Nevertheless, 
the case still teaches an important lesson. While cartels are illegal, 
breaking them requires action and their outright condemnation 
demands evidence of their existence. Moreover, in oligopolistic 
markets, firms may tacitly collude and lawfully coordinate their 
behavior to achieve a cartel-like outcome without any illegal 
agreement.50 The fact that many IP-based markets are made up of a 
small number of large competitors,51 and that virtually any product 
can be sold accompanied by a trademarked and often copyrighted 
logo,52 should give rise to a concern that unexhausted IP rights 
could be used to facilitate tacit collusion in such markets. Thus, the 
first sale doctrine is the failsafe against these invisible cartels. 
The lesson from Bobbs-Merrill can be summarized in the 
following proposition: 
 
 
 49. Bobbs-Merrill, 139 F. at 178 (“It . . . is found as a fact that such notice was put in such 
books, and that its enforcement as an alleged license agreement is . . . an attempt by complainant, 
as a member of said American Publishers’ Association, to enforce as against this defendant the rules 
of such associations and combination fixing prices, in an effort to maintain them. It is part of a 
scheme, and the right of the complainant to maintain this action depends on the validity of 
that scheme or combination.”). 
 50. See Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 227 
(1993) (“Tacit collusion, sometimes called oligopolistic price coordination or conscious 
parallelism, describes the process, not in itself unlawful, by which firms in a concentrated 
market might in effect share monopoly power, setting their prices at a profit-maximizing, 
supracompetitive level by recognizing their shared economic interests and their 
interdependence with respect to price and output decisions.”). 
 51. See Ariel Katz, Making Sense of Nonsense: Intellectual Property, Antitrust, and Market 
Power, 49 ARIZ. L. REV. 837, 866 (2007) [hereinafter Katz, Making Sense]. 
 52. See, e.g., Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Omega, S.A., 131 S. Ct. 565 (2010) (the 
alleged copyright infringement was the importation of watches bearing an engraved 
copyrighted logo); Euro-Excellence Inc. v. Kraft Canada Inc., [2007] 3 S.C.R. 20 (Can.) (the 
alleged copyright infringement was the importation of chocolate bars bearing copyrighted 
logos on their wrappers). 
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Proposition 1: Beware of unexhausted IP rights 
 
The antitrust history of Bobbs-Merrill teaches an important 
lesson: post-sale restraints that are enforceable with unexhausted IP 
rights can facilitate cartels and other types of anticompetitive 
behavior better than contractual restraints. A broader lesson, which 
will be further developed as the Article proceeds, is that while post-
sale restraints may be efficient in certain circumstances, careful 
attention should be given to the question of what legal instruments 
should be used to enforce them. Put simply, with great power comes 
great responsibility; we should be wary of handing the great power 
of property entitlements to irresponsible hands. 
IV. MODERN ANTITRUST APPROACH TOWARDS POST-SALE 
RESTRAINTS 
Post-sale restraints are a subset of a broader type of restraints, 
known as vertical restraints. Antitrust law’s attitude towards 
agreements imposing such restraints (e.g., between manufacturers 
and distributors) has seen remarkable changes throughout its history. 
Since it was enacted in 1890, Section 1 of the Sherman Act has 
declared illegal and punishable “[e]very contract, combination in the 
form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or 
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations.”53 It 
soon became common ground, however, that although “every 
contract, etc.” may be subject to scrutiny, not all contracts are equal. 
One fundamental distinction is between horizontal agreements, or 
those entered between actual or potential competitors (i.e., firms at 
the same level of the distribution chain), and vertical agreements, or 
those entered between firms at different levels of the distribution 
chain (e.g., manufacturer-wholesaler; wholesaler-retailer; retailer-
customer). Another distinction is between restraints that are deemed 
per se illegal and those subject to rule of reason analysis, meaning 
that they would not be deemed illegal unless there is proof of 
anticompetitive effect. “Resort to per se rules is confined to 
restraints . . . ‘that would always or almost always tend to restrict 
 
 53. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012). 
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competition and decrease output.’”54 Further, to justify a per se 
prohibition a restraint must have “manifestly anticompetitive” effects 
and “lack . . . any redeeming virtue.”55 
Early antitrust law was as averse to vertical restraints as it was 
hostile to horizontal restraints, and treated many agreements 
imposing vertical restraints, such as exclusive dealing, tying, and 
resale price maintenance, as per se illegal.56 Over time, however, 
antitrust scholarship began to recommend that horizontal and 
vertical restraints be treated differently because vertical restraints are 
more likely used to enhance efficiency, prevent opportunism, and 
otherwise advance procompetitive outcomes than they are 
implemented for anticompetitive ends.57 Jurisprudence followed 
scholarship, and since the late 1970s,58 the Supreme Court has 
gradually abolished virtually all per se rules applying to vertical 
restraints.59 The last bastion fell in 2007 in Leegin, which overruled 
an almost century-old per se prohibition on resale price 
maintenance.60 Abolishing per se prohibitions reflects the prevailing 
wisdom that not only are such restraints not necessarily harmful, but 
frequently they are beneficial. 
The opening up toward vertical restraints has not crossed over to 
horizontal restraints because horizontal restraints are perceived to be 
more harmful than vertical restraints, and with good reason. 
Horizontal agreements have the ability to eliminate competition 
between rival firms, and this, in turn, results in output limits, raised 
prices, and monopoly profits.61 The resulting harm is not limited to 
the higher prices that consumers have to pay and the resulting 
 
 54. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 886 (2007) 
(citation omitted). 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. at 888. 
 57. Id. at 889. 
 58. Continental T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977). 
 59. Leegin, 551 U.S. at 900–04 (2007). 
 60. A nominally per se rule against tying still exists, but it has been watered down so 
significantly that it is questionable whether it is different from a rule of reason. See Katz, 
Making Sense, supra note 51, at 896. 
 61. Frank H. Easterbrook, Vertical Agreements and the Rule of Reason, 53 ANTITRUST 
L.J. 135, 140 (1984) (“The antitrust laws exist to stop trusts or cartels from reducing the 
output of goods and services. The reduction brings about monopoly prices, the 
conspirators’ goal.”). 
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transfer of surplus from consumers to producers; “[i]t also causes a 
misallocation of resources, as people shift to things that seem 
‘cheaper’ but really cost society more to produce in order to get the 
same level of satisfaction.”62 
In contrast, vertically situated parties do not share a common 
interest in reduced competition. Quite the contrary, a manufacturer 
benefits both when competition among its suppliers is intense and 
when market power among its distributors is limited.63 Similarly, 
distributors would rather be free to deal with competing 
manufacturers upstream and competing retailers downstream than 
with monopolistic firms. In other words, the divergence of interests 
inherent in vertical relationships serves as a check on 
anticompetitive practices.64 
Thus, while it is possible that vertical restraints can be used 
anticompetitively, a growing body of literature has identified myriad 
reasons supporting the proposition that they often serve 
procompetitive goals.65 For example, vertical restraints may 
encourage dealers to invest in developing a local market (by 
advertising or other means) or to supply pre- or post-sale services 
(such as training or repairs). I will discuss some of these 
procompetitive explanations in Part V below. 
Post-sale restraints66 may restrict what a buyer can do with the 
goods she purchased—where she can resell them, to whom, at what 
 
 62. Id. 
 63. HYLTON, supra note 30, at 253 (“Lower prices at the retail level enhance the 
manufacturer’s revenue, other things being equal. That is, once the manufacturer sells the 
good to the retailer, it would prefer to see the retailer charge the lowest possible price, since 
that maximizes the quantity sold. Indeed, once the manufacturer has sold his output to 
retailers, he would be happy to see them drive the resale price to zero.”). 
 64. Leegin, 551 U.S. at 896 (“[I]n general, the interests of manufacturers and 
consumers are aligned with respect to retailer profit margins. The difference between the price 
a manufacturer charges retailers and the price retailers charge consumers represents part of the 
manufacturer’s cost of distribution, which, like any other cost, the manufacturer usually desires 
to minimize.”). 
 65. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK ET AL., THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF 
CANADIAN COMPETITION POLICY 373–99 (2003) (surveying the various pro- and anti-
competitive theories of vertical restraints). 
 66. Like Hovenkamp, I use the term “post-sale restraint” to refer “generically to any 
restriction imposed by a seller on how a purchased good can be used or resold after the initial 
sale” and in this context the term “‘sale’ includes leases, licenses, or other transfers of interest 
short of a technical sale.” See Hovenkamp, supra note 20, at 487. 
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prices, and whether she will have to provide pre- or post-sale 
services, repairs, warranties, etc. As modern antitrust law has opened 
up to vertical restraints and their positive impact on competition, it 
has grown to tolerate agreements that govern and monitor them. In 
the case of goods in which no IP rights subsist, contracts and the 
mere threat of termination serve as the main tools for enforcing such 
restraints.67 In contrast, if IP rights can be relied on to enforce the 
restraints, the additional set of remedies could make those restraints 
more effective.68 
Notably, remedies for breach of contract are usually weaker than 
remedies available for infringement of an intellectual property right. 
Remedies for breach of contract are often limited to expectation 
damages and generally would be filed in state courts.69 For example, 
even though the IP infringement case of eBay v. MercExchange70 
made the grant of injunctive relief less certain than before, 
injunctions are still more likely to be granted in IP infringement 
cases than for breach of contract. The threat of injunction (especially 
when the user faces high switching costs),71 coupled with statutory 
damages that might be available in copyright,72 or treble damages in 
the case of willful patent infringement,73 and attorneys’ fees in both, 
may better ensure compliance with the imposed restrictions than 
contracts. Moreover, contractual restrictions are enforceable only 
against the purchaser who is a party to the contract, but not against 
third parties such as the purchaser’s customers, users, or service 
personnel.74 Therefore, if IP rights subsist in the goods and can be 
 
 67. Contract law is the main, but not the exclusive tool. On some occasions, plaintiffs 
were able to enforce the restraints against third parties relying on some common law 
commercial torts or even concepts of equitable servitudes created by notice. See, e.g., Clairol, 
Inc. v. Sarann Co., 37 Pa. D. & C.2d 433 (1965). 
 68. Hovenkamp, supra note 20, at 492. 
 69. Id. at 539. 
 70. ebay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006). 
 71. Ariel Katz, A Network Effects Perspective on Software Piracy, 55 U. TORONTO L.J. 
155, 207 (2005) [hereinafter Katz, Network Effects]. 
 72. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c). 
 73. Christopher A. Harkins, A Budding Theory of Willful Patent Infringement: Orange 
Books, Colored Pills, and Greener Verdicts, 2007 DUKE L. & TECH. REV., no. 6, at 1, 6. 
 74. Hovenkamp, supra note 20, at 541. 
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relied on to enforce post-sale restraints, producers have a more 
powerful and arguably more effective tool to enforce such restraints. 
The insights from modern antitrust and the economics of post-
sale restraints, namely, that post-sale restraints may be economically 
justified, support rejection of the strongest version of the first sale 
doctrine; yet, they do not easily help choosing which of the 
remaining versions is preferable. Still, many antitrust-minded 
discussions about the first sale doctrine tend to favor one of the 
weaker versions of the doctrine, ranging from preference to no 
exhaustion in the case of parallel imports, to weak or moderate 
versions in other contexts. The following parts of this Article will 
identify three central flaws in the way the insights of modern 
antitrust are relied on to justify the no/weak/moderate versions of 
first sale doctrine, as well as demonstrate why the preferable version 
is a strong one, namely treating the doctrine as a sticky default rule. 
The first flaw arises in the context of debates on the issue of 
parallel trade, where the insights from modern antitrust are 
harnessed to support a rule of national rather than international 
exhaustion. As I explain below, this flaw is mainly a logical one, in 
the sense that, if valid, the logical conclusion from the argument is 
no exhaustion at all. The argument, however, fails to justify the 
purported distinction between national and international exhaustion. 
The second flaw occurs when the virtues of post-sale restraints are 
invoked to justify a weak version of the first sale doctrine while 
failing to notice the subtle, yet critical, difference between remedies 
for breach of contract and remedies for IP infringement, or 
embracing the notion of enhanced IP remedies without recognizing 
their associated costs. The failure here is to fully account for the 
critical institutional differences between property and contract. The 
third flaw, which essentially underlies the second, occurs when the 
first sale doctrine is treated merely as a default rule, assuming that 
working around it must be presumptively efficient. This approach is 
flawed because it adopts a Coasian logic in a notoriously non-
Coasian setting, namely that of intellectual property. 
V. THE FLAW IN THE PARALLEL TRADE DEBATE 
The term “parallel trade” (or “gray market”) refers to situations 
in which goods sold abroad at a lower price than that charged locally 
are imported (or reimported) by an unauthorized dealer to be sold 
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domestically in competition with the same goods sold through the 
local authorized distribution system designated by the 
manufacturer.75 When such goods embed some protected IP, IP 
owners sometimes invoke IP law to ban the unauthorized 
importation. Whether or not IP law should be used for this purpose 
is subject to a heated debate and the actual rules are often 
inconsistent among nations, as well as between different IP laws 
within a nation (i.e., different rules for patents, copyrights, and 
trademarks) and even within a specific national IP law.76 One 
question that plagues this debate is whether the IP right is exhausted 
only upon the first domestic sale authorized by the IP owner 
(national exhaustion) or whether the IP right is exhausted upon the 
first sale authorized by the IP owner regardless of the country in 
which it occurs (international exhaustion). A third, hybrid rule 
mandates that the IP right is exhausted upon any first authorized sale 
within a regional free-trade area, but IP laws might still be used to 
block unauthorized imports from all other countries (regional 
exhaustion).77 Regional exhaustion is currently the law in the 
European Economic Area (consisting of the European Union, 
 
 75. See Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1351, 1379 n.9 (2013) (“The 
term ‘gray market good’ refers to a good that is ‘imported outside the distribution channels 
that have been contractually negotiated by the intellectual property owner.’”) (citing 
MIRANDA FORSYTH & WARWICK A. ROTHNIE, PARALLEL IMPORTS, in THE INTERFACE 
BETWEEN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND COMPETITION POLICY 429 (S. Anderman 
ed., 2007)). 
 76. See, e.g., Euro-Excellence Inc. v. Kraft Canada Inc., [2007] 3 S.C.R. 20 (Can.). It is 
interesting to compare the Justices’ reasoning in this case. Justice Rothstein held that parallel 
imports of a copyrighted work infringes the copyright only when the local copyright holder is 
an assignee rather than an exclusive licensee. Id. at 21–22. Justice Abella, on the other hand, 
rejected the distinction between an assignee and an exclusive licensee and held that the 
unauthorized importation infringes a copyright in both cases. Id. at 24–25 (Abella, J., 
dissenting). Justice Bastarache agreed with Justice Abella that the distinction between an 
assignee and exclusive licensee is immaterial, but he argued that the ban on importation would 
not exist when the work is a logo printed on a wrapper of a consumer good. Id. at 23–24 
(Bastarache, J., concurring). For a thorough discussion of these different opinions, see 
Drassinower, supra note 11. 
 77. See International Exhaustion and Parallel Importation, WORLD INTELLECTUAL 
PROP. ASS’N, 
http://www.wipo.int/sme/en/ip_business/export/international_exhaustion.htm (last visited 
Jan. 13, 2014). 
DO NOT DELETE 5/5/2014 3:43 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2014 
76 
Iceland, Lichtenstein, and Norway).78 Indeed, the difference 
between national exhaustion and international exhaustion was the 
dividing line between the majority and the dissenting opinions in 
Kirtsaeng.79 
Supporters of international exhaustion highlight the benefits of 
increased competition and lower prices that parallel imports can 
bring about and view IP-based prohibition on parallel trade as 
unjustified barriers to international trade.80 Supporters of national 
exhaustion emphasize the benefits arising from tight control by 
producers over their distribution systems and argue that parallel 
imports undermine the integrity of such systems, which results in less 
efficient distribution systems to the detriment of producers and 
consumers alike.81 
Arguments supporting a ban on parallel imports will be familiar 
to anyone acquainted with modern antitrust thinking about vertical 
restraints. The arguments typically warn that one or more of the 
advantages arising from vertical restraints would be lost without IP 
laws banning parallel imports. The discussion below considers these 
arguments and shows that they fail to support an IP-backed ban on 
parallel imports (i.e., national exhaustion). 
A. Price Discrimination 
Proponents of national exhaustion often cite the benefits of 
international price discrimination as a justification for banning 
parallel trade.82 Price discrimination occurs in this context when 
 
 78. Case C-355/96, Silhouette Int’l Schmied GmbH & Co. KG v. Hartlauer 
Handelsgesellschaft mbH, 1998 E.C.R. 1-4799, 2 C.M.L.R. 953 (1998). 
 79. Kirtsaeng, 133 S .Ct. at 1384 (“[I]n my view, [section 602(a)(1)] ties the United 
States to a national-exhaustion framework. The Court’s decision, in contrast, places the United 
States solidly in the international-exhaustion camp.”) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 80. See, e.g., Frederick M. Abbott, First Report (Final) to the Committee on International 
Trade Law of the International Law Association on the Subject of Parallel Importation, 1998 J. 
INT’L ECON. L. 607, 622 (1998). 
 81. Infra, Parts V.A and V.B. 
 82. See John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Kirtsaeng, 654 F.3d 210, 221 (2d Cir. 2011), 
rev’d, 133 S. Ct. 1351 (2013) (reasoning that the first sale doctrine does not apply to copies 
made outside the United States because Congress “obviously intended to allow copyright 
holders some flexibility to divide or treat differently the international and domestic markets for 
the particular copyrighted work”). 
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demand for a product varies across countries and producers set 
different prices in different countries. In other words, producers may 
charge a higher price where demand (or ability to pay) is higher and 
a lower price where demand (or ability to pay) is lower. Parallel trade 
is a form of arbitrage that jeopardizes the producers’ ability to price 
discriminate. Proponents of national exhaustion argue that parallel 
trade should be prohibited because price discrimination promotes 
consumer welfare.83 The main benefits of price discrimination are 
suggested to be threefold: (1) it increases output,84 thereby 
ameliorating some of the inefficiencies otherwise associated with the 
exclusivity inherent in IP rights85 and benefiting consumers with 
lower ability to pay who would not be able to obtain the product if 
the seller could set only a uniform price;86 (2) increased output may 
contribute to achieving economies of scale and learning resulting in 
lower per-unit costs;87 and (3) even when output under price 
discrimination is lower compared to uniform pricing,88 the additional 
 
 83. Kirtsaeng, 133 S. Ct. at 1390 n.27 (“It should not be overlooked that the ability to 
prevent importation of foreign made copies encourages copyright owners . . . to offer copies of 
their works at reduced prices to consumers in less developed countries who might otherwise be 
unable to afford them. The Court’s holding, however, prevents copyright owners from barring 
the importation of such low-priced copies into the United States, where they will compete with 
the higher priced editions copyright owners make available for sale in this country. To protect 
their profit margins in the U.S. market, copyright owners may raise prices in less developed 
countries or may withdraw from such markets altogether . . . . Such an outcome would disserve 
consumers—and especially students—in developing nations and would hardly advance the 
‘American foreign policy goals’ of supporting education and economic development in such 
countries  . . . .”) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 84. See, e.g., David A. Malueg & Marius Schwartz, Parallel Imports, Demand Dispersion, 
and International Price Discrimination, 37 J. INT’L ECON. 167 (1994). 
 85. Id. at 175–81, 189–90. Contra Frederick M. Abbott, First Report (Final) to the 
Committee on International Trade Law of the International Law Association on the Subject of 
Parallel Importation, 1 J. INT’L ECON. L. 607 at 619–21. 
 86. Malueg & Schwartz, supra note 84, at 190. 
 87. See Jerry A. Hausman and Jeffrey K. MacKie-Mason, Price Discrimination and 
Patent Policy, 19 RAND J. ECON. 253, 254 (1988). 
 88. As Guy Rub explains, “If the result of eliminating market segmentation is a cheap 
uniform price, then buyers in developed countries will be much better off, while buyers in 
developing countries will be slightly worse off (as it is almost certain that the uniform price will 
be at least somewhat more expensive than the price in developing countries under a well-
functioning market segmentation scheme). Total buyers’ surplus will likely increase.” Guy A. 
Rub, The Economics of Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc.: The Efficiency of a Balanced 
Approach to the First Sale Doctrine, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. RES GESTAE 41, 46 (2013). 
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monopoly profit will encourage investment in R&D and innovation 
and contribute to dynamic efficiency.89 In sum, the argument for 
price discrimination is that it promotes allocative efficiency (i.e., leads 
to higher output and/or lower costs) and dynamic efficiency 
(encourages innovation). 
But in addition to highlighting the purported efficiency of price 
discrimination, proponents of national exhaustion sometimes tout it 
as socially just because it might help consumers with low willingness 
or ability to purchase goods, from which they would otherwise be 
excluded.90 Thus, the first sale doctrine, which puts sand in the 
wheels of price discrimination, leads not only to deadweight loss, but 
also to distributional injustices. 
These arguments sound compelling enough when discussing 
parallel importation and textbooks where, as it has been argued, 
international exhaustion might force publishers to “raise prices in less 
developed countries or may withdraw from such markets 
altogether.”91 How would a conscientious policy-maker adopt “[s]uch 
an outcome [that] would disserve consumers—and especially 
students—in developing nations and would hardly advance the 
‘American foreign policy goals’ of supporting education and economic 
development in such countries”?92 But if textbooks are not 
convincing enough, then no other area demonstrates these points 
more dramatically than patented pharmaceuticals, where the 
affordability of drugs can be a matter of life or death. The high cost 
associated with developing new drugs is the main justification for 
allowing their patentability and for the high prices that are often 
charged for them, despite the inevitable limitations on accessibility.93 As 
long as the development of new drugs is entrusted in the hands of 
profit-seeking private firms depending on patent protection, millions 
of people in developing countries inevitably will be priced out of the 
market. Arguably, price discrimination could ameliorate this problem 
 
 89. See, e.g., RICHARD POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 203 (2d ed. 2001). 
 90. See, e.g., Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1351, 1390 n.27 (2013) 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. See, e.g., Alan O. Sykes, TRIPS, Pharmaceuticals, Developing Countries, and the 
Doha “Solution”, 3 CHI. J. INT’L L. 47, 57 (2002). 
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of accessibility and would immediately benefit both the manufacturer 
and the consumer in developing countries: drug companies could set 
high prices in developed countries and lower prices in less-developed 
ones. They could spread the cost of developing the drugs across all 
markets and make them available to a wider range of consumers.94 It 
has been argued that drug companies would readily engage in price 
discrimination if they could prevent the cheap drugs from being re-
imported into developed countries, but if they could not, they would 
rather not sell in the less-developed countries at all.95 Banning 
parallel trade, therefore, not only seems to promote economic 
efficiency but also social justice. 
However, while trade in pharmaceuticals vividly highlights the 
issue, it is somewhat of a red herring because some unique features 
of pharmaceuticals make them easy to be used as a stylized model, 
which is not easily generalizable to other goods. 
First, pharmaceuticals are unique because the idea that people 
might die or suffer because they cannot afford the high cost of an 
available drug is morally offensive. If patents make an iPhone 
expensive, the fact that some consumers cannot afford it may be 
considered an unavoidable but acceptable outcome of our choice to 
encourage innovation by granting patents. However, in the case of 
pharmaceuticals, the deadweight loss that may result from a patent-
related monopoly pricing becomes a life or death issue, which 
deserves closer attention. 
Second, the case of patented drugs comes very close to being a 
stylized model favored by economists in the sense that it is relatively 
easy to assume that all else is equal and that differences in demand 
across countries will reflect only differences in ability to pay and not 
something else. We can assume that on average individuals’ 
preference for their health and life is identical across countries96 and 
that differences in demand reflect only differences in affordability 
(that is, the fact that a middle-class American is willing to pay for a 
 
 94. See, e.g., Patricia M. Danzon, Price Discrimination for Pharmaceuticals: Welfare 
Effects in the US and the EU, 4 INT’L J. ECON. BUS. 301 (1997). 
 95. See, e.g., Sykes, supra note 93, at 64. 
 96. Individuals may have different preferences (some are more health conscious than 
others; some have more desire to live than others), but we can assume that these differences are 
not strongly related to nationality, culture, or socio-economic conditions. 
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life-saving drug whereas a middle-class South-African may not pay 
for that same drug reflects only their different abilities to pay and not 
a difference in how each of them values the worth of living). We can 
also assume that the market structure is similar across nations in the 
sense that, all things being equal, a patented drug will have the same 
type and number of therapeutic substitutes in all countries.97 If so, 
differences in demand across countries will not reflect differences in 
the cross-elasticity of demand between the drug and its substitutes 
within each country. In other words, variation in prices across 
countries will indeed reflect differences in ability to pay rather than 
differences in how competitive one market is compared to another.98 
The cost of developing new drugs and the truly global nature of the 
market makes compelling the proposition that price discrimination 
will enable patentees to better spread the cost globally and maximize 
the recovery of their investment. 
Therefore, pharmaceuticals seem to present an example that may 
be close to a stylized model under which enacting laws banning 
parallel imports would improve welfare. Whether this is actually the 
case is another question. Let me raise some skepticism. First, trade in 
pharmaceuticals is strictly regulated. In the United States, for 
example, even if an astute arbitrageur identified an opportunity to 
import cheap drugs from a low-price country, pharmaceutical 
regulation laws would not allow it, irrespective of the exhaustion 
regime under patent law.99 One could then assume that differential 
 
 97. It is possible, of course, that genetic differences could influence the amount of 
available substitutes within and across populations and that the future advances in 
pharmacogenomics would show such differences. 
 98. That is, if the patented drug is the only therapeutic remedy, its holder is a 
monopolist in all countries. If there are substitutes, they are available in all countries. This 
assumption might be too simplistic. Countries with small markets (either because they are 
small or because they have only a small number of residents who can afford paying) can be less 
competitive than larger markets because it may be more difficult to achieve economies of scale 
in distribution, marketing, regulatory compliance, etc. Prices in such cases may be higher. 
 99. Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Role of the FDA in Innovation Policy, 13 MICH. 
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 345, 362–64 (2007). The EU is an exception. As part of the 
objective of creating a common market, the EU adopted a regional exhaustion regime. As a 
result, IP rights cannot be used to prevent the trade of pharmaceuticals between the member 
states. See Nicolas Petit, Parallel Trade: Econ-oclast Thoughts on a Dogma of EU Competition 
Law, in TRADE AND COMPETITION LAW IN THE EU AND BEYOND 332 (Inge Govaere et. al. 
eds., 2011). 
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pricing would be prevalent, and drugs would be universally 
affordable. This is not the case.100 The fact that drugs are often still 
unaffordable in many developing countries despite the illegality in 
parallel trade suggests that there are other reasons for the lack of 
widespread price discrimination.101 Moreover, the theoretical 
argument would predict that developing countries—the supposed 
beneficiaries from bans on parallel imports102—would support 
national exhaustion, but many of them strongly support parallel 
importation of drugs and perceive it as an important policy lever for 
increasing the affordability of medicines in their countries.103 This 
suggests that even in a case that seems close to the stylized model, 
the reality may be much more complicated.104 
 
 100. F. M. Scherer & Jayashree Watal, Post-TRIPS Options for Access to Patented 
Medicines in Developing Nations, 5 J. INTL. ECON. L. 913 (2002). 
 101. One reason is that many developing countries have a small population of highly 
affluent citizens and a majority of extremely poor citizens. In such cases, the local profit-
maximizing price in the developing country is at a developed-country level, which eliminates 
the need for lower pricing. Id. at 930. Another reason might be fear of backlash in developed 
countries if legal versions were available cheaply abroad, resulting in the introduction of price 
controls (in the United States) or tighter price controls (in many other developed 
countries). Id. 
 102. See, e.g., Sykes, supra note 93, at 64. 
 103. See, e.g., CARLOS M. CORREA, WORLD HEALTH ORG.,IMPLICATIONS OF THE DOHA 
DECLARATION ON THE TRIPS AGREEMENT AND PUBLIC HEALTH 17 (2002), available at 
http://apps.who.int/medicinedocs/pdf/s2301e/s2301e.pdf. 
 104. Textbooks may also seem like a textbook example of a case where national 
exhaustion would benefit developing countries. As Justice Ginsburg intimated, Kirtsaeng v. 
John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1351, 1390 n.27 (2013) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting), 
national exhaustion would theoretically benefit developing countries by encouraging copyright 
owners to supply them with low-priced textbooks. While the facts in Kirtsaeng are consistent 
with this prediction, the reality is considerably more complicated. One might assume that since 
until the Court’s holding in Kirtsaeng, copyright owners could prevent parallel importation of 
books, at least if they were printed abroad, scholars and students in developing countries 
would have enjoyed easy access to books at considerably lower prices. This does not seem to be 
the case. For example, Basheer et al. found in a sample of educational books in India (mainly in 
law and social sciences), international publishing houses tend to supply old and outdated 
editions, whereas the latest versions are available only through imports via websites (or through 
mainstream distributors), which cost as much as or more than their western counterparts. 
Shamnad Basheer et al., Exhausting Copyrights and Promoting Access to Education: An 
Empirical Take, 17 J. INTELL. PROP. RTS. 335 (2012). While these findings may indicate the 
publishers refrain from supplying developing countries with the latest editions at low prices for 
fear of exportation, it is not clear how important the exhaustion regime is in developed 
countries. That is, arbitrage might have been a problem for publishers even prior to Kirtsaeng, 
but they have found ways to manage it, and would probably continue doing so even after 
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Unlike this stylized model, in most other cases differences in local 
demand may be the outcome of myriad reasons, with the result that it 
is impossible to generalize and determine a priori whether price 
discrimination should be encouraged or not.105 For example, price 
differences may be a function of differences in the cross-elasticity of 
demand between the product and other products within each country. 
That is, consumers in countries A and B with the same disposable 
income might be willing to pay different prices for the same product 
because they have different preferences for the product given available 
alternatives. To illustrate further, consumers in Ontario might be 
willing to pay a higher price for ice-skates than consumers in Florida 
because they have fewer options for outdoor sports during the winter 
months (in economic terms, the cross-elasticity of demand between 
ice-skates and other sports equipment is high in Florida and low in 
Ontario). If trade is free and shipping costs are not too high, an ice-
skates monopolist may not be able to price-discriminate by 
segregating the Ontario and Florida markets and may choose either to 
sell at a higher price in Ontario (and price consumers in Florida out of 
the market) or to set prices in both locations at the Florida level. We 
cannot determine a priori which outcome is more likely. Nor can we 
say a priori that maintaining the incentive to invest in developing 
better ice-skates requires an ability to segregate the Ontario and 
Florida markets. 
Consider another possibility. It may turn out that because the 
Ontario market is large it attracts many ice-skate manufacturers and 
becomes very competitive. In contrast, the Florida market consists of 
a very small number of ice-skating devotees who are willing to pay 
high prices for skates, but is too small to sustain more than one 
brand. Under these circumstances, if the Florida market could be 
segregated from that of Ontario, consumers in Florida will be 
charged monopoly prices, whereas free trade will allow them to take 
advantage of the competition in Ontario by having skates shipped to 
them. Since we cannot tell with any degree of confidence that laws 
 
Kirtsaeng. See also Rub, supra note 88, at 44–45 (noting that the outcome in Kirtsaeng is 
unlikely to eliminate price discrimination, only to prompt publishers to adopt other forms of 
price discrimination). 
 105. Generally, the welfare effect of price discrimination is ambiguous: it may or may not 
improve welfare. See generally TREBILCOCK ET AL., supra note 65, at 346. 
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prohibiting the importation of skates from Florida to Ontario or vice 
versa are preferable to free trade, there is no rational basis for 
enacting laws banning parallel trade. 
As Nicolas Petit recently observed, price discrimination can also 
reflect different perceptions about a product’s quality among 
consumers.106 Petit provides the example of a bottle of Polish-
branded vodka that “might be perceived as a special product in 
Western Europe—hence western EU consumers are ready to pay a 
high price for this product—and by contrast, be perceived as a 
relatively standard product in Poland—hence Polish consumers are 
only willing to pay a low price for this product. In a setting of this 
kind, the vodka producer will charge different prices in Poland and 
in western European countries.”107 Petit, who supports legal bans on 
parallel trade and exalts the benefits of price discrimination, 
maintains that there is “nothing intrinsically bad” about charging 
different prices in this situation.108 Certainly the producer should not 
be morally or legally condemned for the fact that some consumers 
are willing to pay a premium for his brand, but there is nothing 
particularly laudable about such actions and it hardly follows that 
adopting laws bolstering this outcome is justified or desirable. If the 
better-informed Polish consumers are not willing to pay a premium 
for the particular brand, then we can assume that the price they are 
willing to pay is the more efficient one. Therefore, laws preventing 
the less-informed consumers from being offered the same price seem 
rather odd. Indeed, the ability of the marginal and better-informed 
consumer effectively to determine the market price that all 
consumers pay is one of the virtues of competitive markets.109 
  
 
 106. Petit, supra note 99, at 336. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. (citing NAT’L ECON. RESEARCH ASSOCS. ET AL., THE ECONOMIC 
CONSEQUENCES OF THE CHOICE OF A REGIME OF EXHAUSTION IN THE AREA OF 
TRADEMARKS 104 (1998), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/indprop/docs/tm/report_en.pdf). 
 109. Douglas G. Baird, The Boilerplate Puzzle, 104 MICH. L. REV. 933, 936 (2005). And 
the ability of the less-informed consumer to piggyback on the knowledge of the better-
informed depends on the inability of the seller to discriminate between them. See MARGARET 
JANE RADIN, BOILERPLATE: THE FINE PRINT, VANISHING RIGHTS, AND THE RULE OF LAW 
104 (2012). 
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In sum, it is always possible to articulate a stylized model under 
which enacting laws banning parallel imports would improve welfare, 
and even if pharmaceuticals indeed present such a case,110 it is not 
clear how generalizable the model is to other settings involving trade 
in goods embodying intellectual property where the welfare 
implications of price discrimination are highly ambiguous.111 
Therefore, if such rules are desirable for pharmaceuticals they could 
be incorporated into the already existing elaborate system of drug 
regulation, but there is no need to subordinate the entire area of IP 
law for that goal. 
More generally, recognizing that the welfare effect of price 
discrimination is ambiguous, contemporary literature believes that 
there is no compelling basis for antitrust law to prohibit price 
discrimination.112 It does not follow, however, as proponents of the 
weak versions of the first sale doctrine suggest, that the law should 
encourage price discrimination by outlawing arbitrage. Just as it is 
“difficult for legislators to devise a detailed law that would only attack 
price discrimination that is injurious to competition and to consumer 
welfare,”113 it is difficult to devise laws that would attack only 
injurious arbitrage. 
B. Other Efficiencies of Post-Sale Restraints 
1. Parallel trade and pre-sale and post-sale services 
In addition to the perceived benefits of price discrimination, 
antitrust scholarship has identified a variety of other benefits arising 
from post-sale restraints. The marketing of almost every good 
requires some level of local investment in establishing a distribution 
network, complying with local regulations, creating demand through 
advertisement and other marketing efforts, and offering pre-sale 
services for potential customers (such as demonstrations, training, 
and advice) as well as post-sale services (such as technical support, 
handling repairs and returns, and respecting warranties).114 A 
 
 110. It is not clear that they are. See supra notes 105–09 and accompanying text. 
 111. TREBILCOCK ET AL., supra note 65, at 346. 
 112. Id. at 371. 
 113. Id. at 351. 
 114. See generally Iacobucci, supra note 48 (providing a survey and critique of various 
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manufacturer that is fully integrated into distribution and retail can 
ensure, through managerial orders, that all of these tasks are fulfilled. 
However, full vertical integration may not be possible or even 
desirable, and the manufacturer may need to enter into contracts 
with local firms to provide these services.115 Local dealers 
(distributers or retailers) may be reluctant to make such investments 
if they are concerned that after incurring these costs consumers will 
buy from other dealers offering the goods at a lower price. The 
manufacturer may then impose various vertical restraints, such as 
territorial restraints (limiting the dealers to sell only within a 
designated territory) or price restraints (RPM). If the purpose of 
such restraints is indeed to guarantee investment and those 
investments are indeed necessary to increase output, then these 
restraints are efficient because they will result in more units sold and 
better services delivered.116 
From this perspective, parallel trade is a cause for concern 
because it allows the parallel importer and the foreign dealer to free 
ride on the investments of the local dealer. Parallel trade thus could 
undermine the incentive to invest in building the local market and to 
provide pre-sale and post-sale services, ultimately to the detriment of 
the local dealer, local consumers, and the manufacturer. 
2. Parallel trade and its effect on positional goods 
The appeal of certain products lies in the exclusive status that 
their high prices confer,117 and according to Barak Orbach, RPM is 
not only one of the techniques that producers of such products 
employ to preserve their status, but indeed this technique is “socially 
superior . . . to other production methods for status goods.”118 An 
effort by a producer of such a status good to maintain different high 
prices in different countries may be undermined if parallel 
importation is possible and it has been argued that, indeed, the 
availability of cheaper products sold via unauthorized outlets may 
 
justifications for vertical restraints). 
 115. Hovenkamp, supra note 20, at 489. 
 116. Iacobucci, supra note 48. 
 117. Barak Y. Orbach, The Image Theory: RPM and the Allure of High Prices, 55 
ANTITRUST BULL. 277, 279 (2010). 
 118. Id. at 303. 
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undermine the value or the prestige of brands, especially 
luxury brands.119 
But while this may be a concern for producers of luxury brands, 
or for consumers who have purchased them in the pursuit of social 
distinction, it does not necessarily follow that the state should step 
in and enforce IP laws to remedy their concerns. As Orbach argues, 
antitrust law should be agnostic to RPM when it is adopted to 
maintain the image of luxury goods, because whether the 
phenomenon of status goods is desirable or not, antitrust laws 
should not be used to regulate their production.120 
But in line with Orbach’s observation, IP law should be equally 
agnostic to the sale of positional goods. Just as antitrust law should 
not be used to discourage trade in such goods, IP rules should not 
be relied on to encourage it.121 
C. The Irrelevance of Antitrust Insights to the Parallel Trade Debate 
From price discrimination to brand image, modern antitrust 
scholarship, shaped by modern economics, has identified a variety of 
benefits that post-sale restraints promote, and the identification of 
these benefits has contributed to the gradual erosion of antitrust 
law’s hostility towards vertical restraints. As the preceding sections 
have shown, these benefits have often been invoked to support bans 
on parallel imports, to justify adherence to national exhaustion rules, 
and to reject international exhaustion. This section explains why, 
notwithstanding the importance of these insights, they have very 
limited bearing on the question of whether IP law should adopt a 
model of national, international, or regional exhaustion. 
Consider price discrimination. Even if price discrimination is 
efficient and arbitrage is harmful and should be prevented by law, 
banning parallel trade supports only one type of price discrimination: 
cross-country price discrimination. But price discrimination along 
 
 119. See, e.g., NAT’L ECON. RESEARCH ASSOCS. ET AL., supra note 108, at 93. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Indeed, as Barton Beebe has observed, some aspects of modern IP law have 
developed to establish a new “sumptuary code,” which he describes as socially and 
technologically reactionary, and in contrast with IP’s progressive side, intended “[t]o promote 
the Progress of Science and useful Arts.” Barton Beebe, Intellectual Property Law and the 
Sumptuary Code, 123 HARV. L. REV. 809, 814 (2010) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8). 
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national lines is a very crude type of price discrimination. Enforcing 
it vigorously makes sense only when consumer demand within 
national boundaries is homogenous but demand across nations is 
heterogeneous. Generally, however, the preferences of consumers 
within a nation will be just as varied as the preferences of consumers 
across nations. Therefore, it is unclear why IP law should target and 
prevent international arbitrage but remain deferential to interstate, 
intercity, or interpersonal arbitrage, and there is a serious mismatch 
between the goal and the legal tool that is supposed to achieve it. In 
fact, if encouraging price discrimination and preventing arbitrage is 
the goal of IP law, then the only sensible rule is no exhaustion at all. 
Consider the ice skates example discussed earlier and add in 
consumers in Michigan who have the same demand for ice-skates as 
their neighbors in Ontario. In addition, assume that some ice skates 
are patented or have a copyrighted logo embedded in them. If price 
discrimination is desirable, then the optimal pricing would be to set 
a higher price in Ontario and Michigan and a lower price in 
Florida, and if IP law were to guarantee this pricing structure, it 
should prohibit the unauthorized importation of skates from 
Florida into Michigan just as it should prohibit their importation 
into Ontario. Note, however, that a national exhaustion rule will 
prohibit trade only between Florida and Ontario, but not between 
Florida and Michigan. Consumers in Michigan will be able to 
import cheaper skates from Florida if the prices in Michigan were 
too high, but consumers in Ontario will not. National exhaustion 
will help segregate the market, but on the basis of an economically 
irrelevant dimension: national borders, not differences in demand. 
Moreover, national exhaustion does not support other forms of 
price discrimination and the elaborate methods that sellers often 
employ to maintain them. If IP law should intervene to prevent 
arbitrage, then national exhaustion misses the mark. Not only does 
it segregate markets according to an economically irrelevant 
criterion, but it also targets international arbitrage, where higher 
natural barriers often exist, while neglecting domestic arbitrage, 
which often faces no such barriers. National exhaustion operates 
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where it is less necessary.122 Therefore, if exhaustion should be 
limited to facilitate price discrimination, then logic dictates that no 
exhaustion ought to be the rule, not only national exhaustion. 
In sum, while the virtues of price discrimination are often 
invoked to support national exhaustion rules, there is a serious 
mismatch between the symptom (arbitrage) and the remedy 
(national exhaustion). If arbitrage is a problem, and should IP law be 
harnessed to prevent it, no exhaustion should be the rule. If the goal 
is preventing arbitrage, it seems odd to prevent only cross-border 
arbitrage but permit all forms of domestic arbitrage. Alternatively, 
and preferably, IP law, which has no power to prevent domestic 
arbitrage, should simply stay out of the picture of international 
arbitrage. In fact, the ubiquity of price discrimination schemes that 
occur domestically, notwithstanding the first sale doctrine, should 
discount the arguments highlighting the necessity to 
prevent arbitrage. 
The same point can be made with regard to most of the other 
identified benefits of vertical restraints. It is indisputable that 
establishing and maintaining efficient distribution systems benefits 
producers and consumers alike, and that, as I note in the previous 
sections, often this goal requires the imposition of enforceable post-
sale restraints. If IP law should be asked to play a role in achieving 
better efficiency, national exhaustion provides only a very partial tool. 
For example, a manufacturer might assign exclusive territories to 
different dealers or appoint one dealer to deal with one type of 
customer and another dealer with another type. Each of these dealers 
might need to make specific investments and might be reluctant to do 
so without being offered credible protection against free riding by 
other dealers or the manufacturer. Arguably, the first sale doctrine 
 
 122. This conclusion does not exclude the possibility that national borders do provide an 
economically sound basis for distinguishing between domestic and international arbitrage. If, 
for example, parallel trade is a response to exchange rate fluctuations, then a cross-border 
arbitrage may be more prevalent than domestic arbitrage (and arguably more harmful to the 
local distribution system). While there is evidence that parallel importers are sensitive to 
currency fluctuations, the significance of this single factor is less than clear. See ROSE ANN 
MACGILLIVRAY, PARALLEL IMPORTATION 27 (2010). In any event, it is not clear that 
manufacturers cannot provide sufficient protection to their local dealers against parallel trade 
by resorting to contractual means or that there are other effective ways to hedge the risks of 
currency fluctuations. 
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undermines the credibility of such guarantees because third parties 
might be able to obtain the goods and undercut the local dealer. If 
exhaustion rules should be limited to prevent that scenario, national 
exhaustion seems like an arbitrary and unprincipled choice because it 
targets only one type of arbitrage, and not necessarily the most 
significant one. The only principled choices are either no exhaustion 
at all or, if one does not find the arguments about the detrimental 
effects of the first sale doctrine compelling, international (or indeed 
universal) exhaustion. 
While the myriad virtues of post-sale restraints provide very little 
help in settling the debate about exhaustion rules in the context of 
parallel trade, it might be tempting to conclude that the first sale 
doctrine, by undermining the efficacy of post-sale restraints, is 
indeed an inefficient IP rule, a relic from an era in which the 
economics of vertical restraints were not well understood. However, 
the next Part suggests that such a conclusion should not be arrived at 
precipitously. Recognizing that some post-sale restrictions could be 
efficient and acknowledging that antitrust law moved in the right 
direction when it stopped treating agreements imposing such 
restraints as per se unlawful is one thing. But it hardly follows that 
post-sale restraints should be enforced as a rule of property, let alone 
a default one. 
VI. THE PROPERTY/CONTRACT FLAW 
Modern antitrust teaches us that post-sale restraints are not 
necessarily harmful and that they may actually be quite beneficial and 
necessary to organize sophisticated distribution systems when a 
manufacturer is not fully integrated into distribution and retail.123 
The following line of reasoning may thus be adopted: if post-sale 
restrictions are efficient, they should be enforceable, and if enforcing 
them on the grounds of IP infringement is easier than on the 
grounds of breach of contract, an IP remedy should be available. 
Unfortunately, this line of reasoning is flawed. Remedies for 
 
 123. E.g., Hovenkamp, supra note 20, at 489 (“[V]ertical restrictions are a very 
important compromise between unrestricted market transactions and vertical integration 
through ownership. They permit business entities to have some of the advantages of the 
market-displacing mechanisms of the business firm but without all of the costs that outright 
ownership entails.”). 
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infringement of an IP right may be more effective than those 
available for breach of contract. However, whether greater efficacy is 
desirable depends not only on the benefits of more compliance, but 
also on the costs that may be externalized to third parties.124 
Therefore, before concluding that greater enforceability is better, it is 
important to carefully understand why and against whom post-sale 
restrictions may need to be enforced. 
Whether post-sale restraints are imposed to facilitate geographic 
price discrimination, to maintain the status of a luxury good, or to 
encourage investment in building a distribution system, or in the 
provision of pre-sale or post-sale services, a closer look at the antitrust 
scholarship reveals that it has focused on the relationships between 
collaborating firms attempting to organize an efficient production 
and distribution system. We can generalize this insight to the 
following proposition: 
 
Proposition 2: When firms jointly participate in a productive 
enterprise that is prone to opportunism, various enforceable restrictions 
may be necessary. 
 
Additional support for Proposition 2 can also be derived from 
the New Institutional Economics literature that explores the 
connection between the theory of the firm and intellectual property 
rights.125 Intellectual property rights may be important for 
overcoming the acute problems arising from the incompleteness of 
contracts when firms involved in joint production need to contract 
around information. In these cases, information presents a unique 
challenge for efficient contracting. Authors or inventors will often 
lack the complementary assets necessary for successfully 
commercializing their intellectual goods.126 Therefore, they will need 
to collaborate with coproducers, and they will need to disclose their 
 
 124. Henry E. Smith, Toward an Economic Theory of Property in Information, in 
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF PROPERTY LAW 104 (Kenneth Ayotte & 
Henry E. Smith eds., 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1712089. 
 125. See generally Dan L. Burk, Intellectual Property and the Firm, 71 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 3 (2004). 
 126. See, e.g., David J. Teece, Capturing Value from Technological Innovation: 
Integration, Strategic Partnering, and Licensing Decisions, 18 INTERFACES 46 (1988). 
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new information for this purpose. However, after A 
(author/inventor) has disclosed her new information to B 
(publisher/producer), the information cannot be untaught. This 
creates an acute problem. A knows that B, having learned the new 
information, may renege on whatever promises were given and 
therefore will demand to be paid in full in advance. B, not knowing 
what the information is and whether it is valuable at all, will not 
agree to pay until after learning what the information is.127 Even if 
the parties can ultimately draft a suitable contract, the contract will 
be inherently incomplete because the information under question 
cannot be easily defined. Further, any contract will not be binding 
on third parties who may have learned the information from B. IP 
rights facilitate knowledge-transfer and coproduction by creating an 
enforceable asset that one can contract about. This reduces the cost 
of “deterring opportunistic rent seeking by team members while 
simultaneously increasing trust and cooperation within the team.”128 
Proposition 2 is consistent with Stephen Maurer and Suzanne 
Scotchmer’s “profit neutrality” principle, which they define as “the 
principle that a patentholder’s reward should not depend on whether 
he has the ability to work the patent efficiently himself.”129 Applied 
to the present context, “profit neutrality” means that IP owners 
should be able to impose post-sale restraints to achieve the same 
profit that they would be able to gain if they were fully integrated 
into distribution and retail. In such situations of joint production, 
treating IP rights as default entitlements and permitting parties to 
contract around them to achieve efficiency in a profit-neutral way 
makes sense.130 However, the teachings of the literature that 
supports Proposition 2 cannot immediately apply to restraints that do 
 
 127. If the information is tacit and B will not learn it unless A spent the time and effort 
to teach it, B will be concerned that after receiving the payment, A may fail to perform its 
obligation to teach. See Ashish Arora, Licensing Tacit Knowledge: Intellectual Property Rights 
and the Market for Know-How, 4 ECON. INNOVATION & NEW TECH. 41, 43 (1995). 
 128. Paul J. Heald, A Transaction Cost Theory of Patent Law, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 473, 
489 (2005). 
 129. Stephen M. Maurer & Suzanne Scotchmer, Profit Neutrality in Licensing: The 
Boundary Between Antitrust Law and Patent Law, 8 AM. L. ECON. REV. 476, 480 (2006). 
 130. See also Anne S. Layne-Farrar, An Economic Defense of Flexibility in IPR Licensing: 
Contracting Around “First Sale” in Multilevel Production Settings, 51 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 
1149, 1184–85 (2011). 
DO NOT DELETE 5/5/2014 3:43 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2014 
92 
not involve situations of joint production and cannot generally 
support the imposition of enforceable post-sale restraints against 
third parties. 
For example, even if and when territorial restrictions should 
justifiably protect a local dealer from opportunistic behavior by other 
members of the same distribution system (other dealers or the 
manufacturer), it does not directly follow that third parties who are 
not members of the same distribution system and who lawfully 
purchased a product in another territory should be prohibited from 
reselling them in the local territory. The cost/benefit calculus of 
making the territorial restriction enforceable against third parties is 
not the same as the calculus of enforcing the restraints against 
members of the distribution system. Although restraining the third 
party might be efficient—inasmuch as its activities and interests are 
not fully aligned with those of members of the distribution system—
the likelihood that sales made by third parties will seriously 
undermine the viability of the authorized distribution system 
diminishes with distance from the authorized channel, as well as over 
time. Therefore, the need to control third parties diminishes too. At 
the same time, if restraints were to be enforceable against third 
parties whose identity cannot be determined ex ante, they should 
come in the form of an in rem, or property, entitlement. The trouble 
is that if restraints are enforced in rem, they may be enforced even 
when and where the reasons for imposing them no longer exist, or in 
situations where enforcing them may not be socially beneficial. 
Moreover, such an in rem right might interfere without good reason 
with buyers’ freedom to seek the best deal available, freedom which 
drives competitive markets and innovation in the first place, or with 
buyers’ freedom to use the goods that they purchase in the best way 
they see fit, including as inputs in their own innovative endeavors. 
For example, consider a company introducing an innovative 
product such as the iPad. The benefits of post-sale restraints are easy 
to describe. Assume that successfully marketing such a product 
requires setting up a distribution network that involves at least some 
retailers who can display the new product, allow potential consumers 
to touch and feel it, and provide on-site demonstrations and 
training. Retailers providing such services face higher costs than 
retailers who do not, and they might be reluctant to provide them if 
consumers could take advantage of these services but then purchase 
the product from another retailer (e.g., online) selling the product at 
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a discount. This is the paradigmatic case in which post-sale restraints, 
limiting the ability of one retailer from undercutting the other, 
might be justified. Such post-sale restraints could be imposed by 
contract and if the product is desirable enough for the retailer, the 
threat of termination might be enough to secure compliance. 
However, contractual restraints are enforceable only against the 
contractual parties and would not protect the retailer from 
competition from other sellers who are not bound by any 
contractual restriction. 
Or, for example, suppose that the manufacturer has implemented 
a price discrimination scheme under which some dedicated retailers 
sell the product to some consumers at a significant discount.131 Such 
retailers might be bound contractually from competing with the 
retailers in the other segment, but these contracts will not bind third 
parties, such as arbitrageurs buying the product from these dedicated 
retailers at the discounted price and then reselling it in competition 
with the ordinary retailers. This outcome could be averted if the 
manufacturer were permitted to opt-out of the first sale doctrine, 
especially since a product such as an iPad comprises numerous 
patented components and is loaded with copyrighted software. If the 
first sale of the iPad does not exhaust these patents and copyrights, 
arbitrage could be prevented more easily because every unauthorized 
reseller would infringe those rights. 
So far so good, but there is a downside too. If the sale of the 
iPad does not exhaust these patents and copyrights, any further 
transfer of the iPad would require the permission of the relevant 
patent and copyright owners (which may or may not be the 
producer) for the entire duration of the patents or the copyrights. 
Consequently, the buyer would not be permitted to sell her old iPad 
a few (or even many) years down the road, not even when the 
product becomes obsolete, without violating IP rights. It is evident 
that such long-lasting restrictions, which apply in rem, are not 
necessary for solving the original problem, namely opportunism 
among retailers. Further, the restrictions will remain valid even when 
opportunism is no longer a concern, and the duration of such 
 
 131. For example, consider Apple’s education pricing. See Apple Store for Education, 
APPLE, http://store.apple.com/us-hed/findyourschool (last visited Jan. 13, 2014). 
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restrictions and their in rem applicability may impose diverse costs on 
future buyers and users, costs that the producer and the first buyer 
will not internalize because they may be borne by third parties, or in 
any event will be heavily discounted because they may be remote 
or unknown. 
Therefore, while the availability of remedies for IP infringement 
reduces the costs of enforcing post-sale restrictions, such remedies 
may increase the social costs associated with such restraints. This 
leads us to the next proposition: 
 
Proposition 3: The economics of joint production do not normally 
justify long-lasting post-sale restraints or restraints imposed on third 
parties. Therefore, enforcing post-sale restraints should not normally be 
part of the property bundle. 
 
Proposition 3 is crucial to the design of an optimal exhaustion 
rule because, if true, it would reject the weaker forms of exhaustion. 
It is important to elaborate not only on why and when post-sale 
restraints are efficient, but also on the optimal way to enforce them 
is. In other words, formulating the optimal exhaustion rule requires 
not only an understanding of when post-sale restraints are efficient, 
but also an ability to determine whether they should be enforced as a 
matter of contract law (and perhaps tort law) or IP law, and against 
whom they should be enforced. 
A. The Costs and Benefits of Infringement Remedies 
In his recent analysis of the first sale doctrine, Herbert 
Hovenkamp embraced the superiority of enforcement through 
infringement actions over suits for breach of contract and criticized 
the U.S. government for taking the position that post-sale 
restrictions should be enforced solely as a matter of contract law, for 
which it argued in its amicus brief in Quanta.132 Hovenkamp 
criticized the government (as well as the Court for deciding the case 
in a manner consistent with the government’s position) for being 
 
 132. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Quanta 
Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617 (2008) (No. 06-937), 2007 WL 3353102, 
at *5. 
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more concerned about form than substance,133 and as “excessively 
draconian”134 for yielding a per se rule that denies automatically 
“with no consideration of the restraint’s purpose or effect”135 any IP 
remedy once a sale is found. Hovenkamp lists several advantages of 
allowing IP remedies for breach of post-sale restraints: their 
applicability to a large and diverse number of downstream people;136 
availability of injunctive relief;137 the calculation of damages on the 
basis of a reasonable royalty together with interest and costs (and up 
to treble damages for willful patent infringement) rather than 
expectation damages;138 and a possible jurisdictional advantage of 
suing in a federal rather than in a state court.139 In addition to these 
legal advantages, Hovenkamp emphasizes that although theoretically 
a seller might be able to bind all downstream purchasers 
contractually by demanding that the initial purchaser not only agree 
to the restriction, but also, upon pain of damages, impose the 
restriction on all parties downstream, this solution would be messy 
and would increase transaction costs significantly.140 Like a servitude 
on real property that provides a neater and cheaper solution, 
enforcing a post-sale restriction as a matter of IP law would be 
efficient at least as long as a purchaser has timely notice of 
the restriction.141 
Hovenkamp is not the first commentator to parallel the common 
law’s tolerance towards land servitudes with the first sale doctrine’s 
relationship to post-sale restraints.142 However, upon closer 
inspection, rather than confirming the superiority of enforcing post-
sale restraints with IP remedies, the analogy to land servitudes 
demonstrates the inferiority of such products. 
 
 133. Hovenkamp, supra note 200, at 540–41. 
 134. Id. at 546. 
 135. Id. at 541. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. at 543. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. at 544. 
 140. Id. at 541. 
 141. Id. at 541–43, 546. 
 142. See, e.g., Glen O. Robinson, Personal Property Servitudes, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1449 
(2004); see also Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, The New Servitudes, 96 GEO. L.J. 885 (2008) 
(presenting a critical survey of this literature). 
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The economics of efficient land use and the economics of 
efficient distribution (and use) of goods embedding IP differ 
substantially. Although both land servitudes and post-sale restraints 
may solve organizational problems and foster more efficient asset 
use, as I explain below, the organizational problems are different, 
and the negative effects of enforceable servitudes/restraints are 
different. Consequently, the costs and benefits of various instruments 
for enforcing the restraints (e.g., contract versus property rules) are 
not the same, and it would be an unfortunate error to apply 
uncritically lessons from one area to the other. 
Despite early skepticism, the common law has grown to accept 
the utility of land servitudes as a means of private ordering to 
coordinate productive land use and reduce potential conflicts in ways 
that supplement and sometimes substitute for land-planning law.143 
Increased urban density144 and the inevitable externalities that the 
use of one piece of land creates for others, coupled with the finite 
nature of land, render indispensable the need for restrictions on use. 
Further, the attributes of land suggest that the need for coordination 
is as durable as the land itself, is unlikely to decrease over time, and 
will often outlive the tenure of those who own or possess the land at 
the time the need to coordinate arises. Under such circumstances, 
the cost-inefficacy of reliance on contracts to enforce land-use 
restrictions is evident and the superiority of servitudes is clear. 
The common law’s early reluctance towards servitudes has 
traditionally focused on three types of concerns: the problem of 
notice and information costs that may arise when purchasers of 
burdened land may not be aware of restrictions limiting the use of 
the purchased asset;145 the problem of limitations on the freedom of 
future generations to manage resources wisely, autonomously, and 
efficiently;146 and concerns over other externalities, such as restraints 
on trade and competition or the limitation on individuals’ 
fundamental rights.147 However, the development of registration 
 
 143. Van Houweling, supra note 142, at 892. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. at 893. 
 146. Id. at 900. 
 147. Id. at 905. 
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systems (together with notice-encouraging doctrines)148 and the fact 
that the value involved in land transactions typically justify incurring 
the costs of learning about potential land restrictions, have 
minimized the notice problem associated with land servitudes. The 
problem of the future may still be of concern in land, but it is 
precisely the need to coordinate land use over long periods of time 
that creates the need for enforceable use-restrictions and highlights 
the superiority of enforcing restrictions as servitudes rather than by 
contract. It makes sense to prefer solutions for known and pressing 
needs arising today that affect the foreseeable future and to discount 
the possibility that such solutions would create possible but 
undeterminable problems in the distant future. Similarly, the need to 
impose restraints to internalize external costs weighs in favor of land 
servitudes, while the local nature of land makes it less likely that land 
servitudes will systematically result in a significant anticompetitive 
harm or otherwise violate important public policies. When these 
negative consequences do occur, antitrust law, the common law of 
restraints on trade,149 and the ability of courts to invalidate such 
servitudes150 may effectively weed out the harmful restraints. 
From an organizational perspective, both land servitudes and 
post-sale restraints may promote productive asset use in situations 
when integration is incomplete or absent. Obviously, if one firm 
owned all tracts of land in a relevant area, it would internalize all 
costs associated with land use and would not need to create 
servitudes because it could decide for itself the optimal way to use 
the land. Likewise, a firm that is fully integrated into distribution and 
retail would not need to impose post-sale restraints because it could 
control all externalities between its units through managerial orders. 
Beyond these similarities, however, land servitudes and IP servitudes 
(that is, post-sale restraints enforceable as a matter of IP law), are 
mirror images of each other. 
Unlike land, whose efficient use may require durable restraints 
that would be enforceable against future buyers, the organizational 
 
 148. See generally Herbert Hovenkamp, Notice and Patent Remedies, 88 TEX. L. REV. 
221 (2011). 
 149. See, e.g., MICHAEL TREBILCOCK, THE COMMON LAW OF RESTRAINT OF TRADE: A 
LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 307 (1986). 
 150. Van Houweling, supra note 142, at 905. 
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problems in the context of collaboration in the production and 
distribution of innovative goods occur mainly at the early stages of 
the product life-cycle:151 production problems disappear immediately 
after the good is produced,152 and distribution problems largely 
disappear upon the distribution of the good or shortly thereafter. 
Notably, these problems cease to exist long before the IP rights 
expire (particularly in the case of copyright). Moreover, as 
coproducers, the firms are in privity and this enables them to rely on 
contracts for addressing many of the organizational problems 
associated with efficient distribution.153 Further, because the 
standard remedy for breach of contract is only damages, and the 
plaintiff needs to prove actual damage, a party bound by a 
contractually valid post-sale restraint may be able to put the good to 
better use when no damage can be shown or otherwise when the 
breach is efficient. Thus, while IP remedies may increase the 
enforceability of post-sale restraints, the benefit is marginal and must 
be weighed against the fact that the threat of IP remedies might 
prevent the efficient use of the good long into the future, even when 
they no longer serve their original purpose. 
 
 151. Ariel Katz, Substitution and Schumpeterian Effects over the Life Cycle of Copyrighted 
Works, 49 JURIMETRICS J. 113 (2009) [hereinafter Katz, Substitution]. 
 152. Id. 
 153. As opposed to organizational problems during the development and production 
stages, which contract law, alone, may not solve, and which IP rights may help to ameliorate. 
Id. at 141–42. 
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Figure 1 is a graphic representation of the circles of relationship 
between an IP owner and interested parties through the life-cycle of 
an innovative good. The inner circle is the IP owner and its 
coproducers, or the several firms that participate in the production or 
initial distribution of an innovative good. In the second circle are the 
consumers who buy the goods produced in the inner circle. The 
third circle is populated by the users who may at one point be 
interested in obtaining and using the innovative good but do not 
obtain it directly from the inner circle. Two vectors—distance and 
time—are also presented. Distance reflects the transactional 
proximity between the IP owner and the user. As the distance 
between the user and the IP owner increases, concerns about 
opportunism diminish. The time vector reflects temporal proximity 
between production, distribution, and use. 
As noted above, the benefits of post-sale restraints are 
concentrated primarily within the inner circle of the IP owner and 
the several firms that participate in the production or initial 
distribution of an innovative good. Hence, the marginal benefit from 
having enforceable restraints diminishes as we move along the 
vectors of distance and time. At the same time, the marginal social 
costs associated with goods encumbered by restraints could easily 
increase over distance and time because any use inconsistent with the 
Figure 1 An IP owner, coproducers, and users 
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restraint would require the IP owners’ permission, yet the cost of 
obtaining such permission could easily increase over time and 
distance. I will discuss the reasons why we should care about these 
costs in Part VII. 
In sum, even though post-sale restraints might be efficient and 
justifiably enforceable, it does not follow that enforcing them should 
be part of the bundle of property rights available to IP owners, 
allowing them to reach out in distance and time and impose long 
lasting restraints of diminishing social utility. The first sale doctrine, 
therefore, reflects the law’s sensitivity to the differences between the 
costs and benefits of contract as opposed to property entitlements. 
The law grants strong property rights that can promote efficient 
contracting between coproducers at the early and critical stages of 
production and distribution, but guarantees that trade will not be 
encumbered through durable, but often unnecessary, restraints 
later on. 
VII. THE (NON)-COASIAN FLAW 
It follows from the preceding discussion that when post-sale 
restraints are efficient, they should generally be imposed and 
enforced as a matter of contract law, not property. However, there 
might be exceptions justifying a resort to IP remedies. For example, 
if it could be demonstrated that a life-saving drug would not be 
produced or would not be sold in developing countries unless all 
opportunities of arbitrage are eliminated, and that IP remedies are 
necessary, then we should hesitate ruling them out. It is also 
possible that the use of “viral” restrictive conditions common in 
open-source software licenses helps solve long-term coordination 
problems between noncontracting contributors, making open-
source projects similar to land and justifying greater tolerance 
towards this kind of “new servitudes.”154 Moreover, it is also 
possible to minimize the potential costs resulting from IP-based 
 
 154. See Van Houweling, supra note 142; Massimo D’Antoni & Maria Alessandra Rossi, 
Appropriability and Incentives with Complementary Innovations (Dep’t of Econ., Univ. of 
Siena, Working Paper Series, No. 603 (Nov. 2010)), available at http://www.econ-
pol.unisi.it/quaderni/603.pdf. 
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restraints through liberal application of various defenses.155 
Arguably, fair use or other defenses (such as misuse, or the repair 
and construction defense in patent law) can help ensure that 
inefficient post-sale restraints will not be enforced. 
Therefore, the issue is not so much about a categorical choice 
between IP remedies and contract remedies (and whether clever 
drafting can guarantee that a restriction is found to be a license 
condition rather than contractual covenant),156 but about the design 
of default exhaustion rules. In other words, the important question 
is, assuming exhaustion is the default, how strong or sticky this 
default rule should be. Under what conditions should courts enforce 
deviations from the default and what are the grounds for invalidating 
such deviations? Equally important is the question of who bears the 
burden of upholding or invalidating the restraint and how heavy this 
burden is. Should the restraint be considered presumptively valid 
unless proven otherwise, or should contracting around the first sale 
doctrine be regarded as presumptively invalid unless the IP owner 
demonstrates its efficiency? In this Part, I advocate the latter option 
and offer the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 4: Contracting around the first sale doctrine should be 
presumptively invalid. Courts should refuse to enforce license conditions 
or contract terms limiting the ability of the user to resell goods 
embodying IP rights unless the IP owner can demonstrate that the 
restraint is necessary and superior to other means to achieve efficiency. 
 
To support Proposition 4, I need first to reject the view that 
exhaustion is no more than a simple default rule that can be easily 
modified by contracts that would generally be held valid. Current 
case law tends to reflect this paradigm and as a result, many cases are 
decided on the basis of relatively marginal legal questions such as 
what constitutes a valid contract,157 whether a first conditional sale 
 
 155. Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1351, 1389 (2013) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting) (arguing that principles of fair use and implied license can ameliorate many of the 
negative consequences that the majority was concerned about when it favored international 
exhaustion over national exhaustion). 
 156. MDY Indus. v. Blizzard Entm’t, Inc., 629 F.3d 928 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 157. See, e.g., ProCD v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996) (discussing the 
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preempts exhaustion,158 whether there was a sale or just a license,159 
and whether restraints imposed by notice are sufficient.160 These 
cases seem to be premised on the view that the first sale doctrine is 
merely a simple default rule, which can be worked around as long as 
the IP owner has used the proper legal tool. 
ProCD v. Zeidenberg161 represents the classic articulation of this 
paradigm. While strictly speaking, ProCD is not a first sale case, it is 
relevant because it stands for the proposition that IP rights create 
only default entitlements from which transacting parties can freely 
deviate by contract and that such contract terms are generally 
enforceable “unless their terms are objectionable on grounds 
applicable to contracts in general (for example, if they violate a rule 
of positive law, or if they are unconscionable).”162 In this decision, 
Judge Easterbrook was clear that deviating from the entitlements set 
by copyright law does not “violate a rule of positive law” because the 
public policy embedded into copyright law’s choice of entitlement 
cannot be affected by contracts.163 In other words, property is 
property and contracts are contracts. Unlike a copyright, which is “a 
right against the world,”164 “[c]ontracts generally affect only their 
parties, [and] do not create ‘exclusive rights.’”165 
According to Judge Easterbrook, license terms accompanying 
works or products are conceptually identical to any other feature of 
the products. Both determine what the consumer can do with the 
product, and both are reflected in the product’s price and mediated 
through the market. Generally, courts do not design products, do 
not determine their prices, and therefore should not intervene in the 
 
validity of shrink-wrap licenses and holding that they are valid, as long as the buyer can return 
the product after having an opportunity to read the terms). 
 158. Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617 (2008) (leaving the 
question open). 
 159. Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 621 F.3d 1102 (2010). 
 160. UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Augusto, 628 F.3d 1175, 1180 (9th Cir. 2011) 
(distinguishing Vernor on—among other things—lack of acceptance of the restrictions). 
 161. 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996). 
 162. Id. at 1449. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. at 1454. 
 165. Id. 
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conditions accompanying their sale: “Competition, not judicial 
oversight, is the best protector of consumers’ interests.”166 
The logic that underlies the ProCD judgment arises from the 
Coase Theorem that asserts that in the absence of transaction costs, 
bargaining will lead to an efficient outcome regardless of the initial 
allocation of property rights.167 Assuming away external effects, or as 
the judgment stated, “[c]ontracts generally affect only their parties,” 
the distinction between property and contract provides a seemingly 
elegant answer to the question of whether there is any problem in 
contracting around limitations to IP rights. Assuming that such 
restrictions affect only their parties, a contract suggests that—save for 
some extraordinary circumstances—the transaction must be efficient. 
Assuming also that markets are perfectly competitive and consumers 
are fully informed, license terms can indeed be treated like any other 
product feature. Indeed, in a lecture given shortly before he 
rendered his decision in ProCD, Judge Easterbrook explicitly 
referenced the Coase Theorem when he stated that given the 
difficulty of setting optimal IP rules, the most sensible approach is to 
encourage Coasian bargaining by creating clear and enforceable 
property rights, facilitating bargaining, and “enjoy[ing] 
the benefits.”168 
In a Coasian world, it does not matter whether the first sale 
doctrine exists or not because transacting parties will always be able 
to efficiently bargain about the rights to resale or otherwise use an 
item. If resale is efficient, the owner and the user will enter into a 
contract permitting it, and if it is not, the contract will restrict it 
regardless of the initial allocation of the resale right. If some 
consumers value the ability to resell the good more than others, then 
producers would be happy to sell the goods with or without such 
rights at different prices. Under the logic used in the ProCD case, we 
should not worry about the question of exhaustion. All that the law 
has to do is treat the first sale doctrine as no more than a baseline for 
contracting, permit and uphold all subsequent bargaining, and then 
let us all “enjoy the benefits.” 
 
 166. Id. at 1453. 
 167. Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960). 
 168. Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL 
F. 207. 
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While attractive, this policy prescription is flawed. It is flawed 
because the world of IP is notoriously non-Coasian.169 The need for  
intellectual property rights, and the need to define their limits, arises 
precisely because the world of information is non-Coasian.170 
In a Coasian world, there would be no need for IP rights because 
inventors or authors could secure the necessary return on their 
investment by contracting with potential users.171 They would pitch 
their ideas to potential users and investors, and interested parties 
would undertake to finance it. Unfortunately, relying solely on 
contracts may lead to suboptimal levels of investment due to several 
market failures. For example, as Kenneth Arrow has observed, an 
investor may be reluctant to invest in another person’s innovation 
before learning what the innovation is, but will have no reason to 
invest once the information has been disclosed and can be used by 
anyone for free.172 Other failures may be a result of high transaction 
costs, such as the need to transact with numerous potential investors; 
the need to finance before it is clear what, if anything, will ultimately 
be invented or created and how valuable will it be; and the 
realization that investors might be better off waiting until the good is 
created through the investment of other parties and then copy it for 
free. Intellectual property rights are needed precisely for addressing 
these and similar market failures. 
One may concede that even if prior to creating the intellectual 
good the world is non-Coasian, Coasian bargaining over the rights 
to use such goods, once created, is entirely possible. Arguably, then, 
 
 169. The term “Coasian” is misleading because it actually ignored Coase’s main 
contribution, namely, that transaction costs are pervasive and important and that the law does 
matter. As Coase himself wrote, “[t]he world of zero transaction costs has often been 
described as a Coasian world. Nothing could be further from the truth. It is the world of 
modern economic theory, one which I was hoping to persuade economists to leave.” See 
RONALD H. COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW 174 (1988). 
 170. Indeed, this is true for any type of property, not only IP. See Thomas W. Merrill & 
Henry E. Smith, Making Coasean Property More Coasean, 54 J. L. & ECON. S77, 93 (2011) 
(“We have property and endow it with a basic architecture of exclusion rules supplemented by 
rules and standards governing proper use, precisely because of transaction costs.”). 
 171. See Harold Demsetz, Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint, 12 J. L. & 
ECON. 1, 12 (1969). See also Matthew Sag, Beyond Abstraction: The Law and Economics of 
Copyright Scope and Doctrinal Efficiency, 81 TUL. L. REV. 187, 209 (2006). 
 172. KENNETH ARROW, ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF RISK-BEARING 152 (1976); HENRY 
CHESBROUGH, OPEN BUSINESS MODELS 68 (2006). 
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once the law grants an IP right, any subsequent bargaining with 
respect to its use should be regarded as presumptively efficient. This 
view seems to be implied in Judge Easterbrook’s position.173 The 
problem with this view is that if the post-creation world were indeed 
Coasian, there would be no need to limit the duration and scope of 
IP rights;174 the term of exclusivity would be mediated through the 
market and the price system. There would be no need for fair use or 
other limitations on owners’ rights because the socially optimal 
outcome would be achieved even if owners had total control. Any 
socially efficient use of the work would be authorized: “You want to 
criticize my work? Go ahead, here’s a license”; “You want to build 
on my ideas to develop a better product that will displace my own? 
No problem, here’s your license.” In a perfectly Coasian world, what 
IP law allocates to owners and users respectively would serve only as 
a starting point from which transacting parties would freely negotiate 
to maximize their own, and society’s, gains.175 Indeed, such 
allocation could be totally arbitrary as long as the law clearly defined 
what was allocated to whom and then enforced all subsequent contracts. 
But our world is not perfectly Coasian, and limitations on IP 
rights play an important role in the real world.176 Therefore, we 
cannot assume that IP law provides only the baseline from which 
bargaining will necessarily, or even presumptively, increase social 
welfare.177 This does not mean that contracting out of limitations on 
IP rights cannot increase social welfare; we have no reason to assume 
that the initial allocation is always optimal, and we have grounds to 
believe that sometimes it may not be. However, if the law limits the 
 
 173. Easterbrook, supra note 168. 
 174. Cf. Merrill & Smith, supra note 170, at 32 (“In a world of zero transaction costs, it 
would not matter whether property rights are broad or narrow, clear or ambiguous—or in rem 
or in personam.”). 
 175. Easterbrook, supra note 168. 
 176. Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books, 
Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281, 316 (1970); see also Ariel Katz, 
Copyright and Competition Policy, in HANDBOOK OF THE DIGITAL CREATIVE ECONOMY 209, 
215 (Ruth Towse & Christian Handke eds., 2013) [hereinafter Katz, Copyright 
and Competition]. 
 177. Except, perhaps, in the case of questions of who is the first owner, as opposed to the 
question of what this ownership entails. IP law clearly contemplates assignments of ownership, 
or the grant of licenses, which, by definition presuppose the possibility that the owner is not 
necessarily the best exploiter. 
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term and scope of IP rights under the assumption that market 
failures exist, and that transacting parties’ private costs and benefits 
are not fully aligned with social costs and benefits, then it logically 
follows that there can be no presumption that contracting around 
such limitation increases social welfare.178 
This is particularly true when intellectual goods are distributed 
on a mass scale subject to restrictive terms. If it becomes difficult to 
access intellectual goods to which such terms do not apply, the 
practical result may be quite similar to an in rem obligation. 
Moreover, when technological measures reinforce the restrictions 
and the law prohibits circumventing them, the distinction collapses 
altogether because the restrictions affect everyone in touch with the 
work—even those who are not privy to the initial contract or 
the license.179 
Returning to the ProCD case, Judge Easterbrook’s 
characterization of license terms as a product feature generally 
immune to judicial oversight does not support the weight of the 
laissez faire conclusion he arrives at. While it is true that as a general 
matter competition protects consumers’ interests better than judicial 
oversight, there are at least three reasons why market competition 
may not create conditions that justify a presumption of efficiency for 
contracting out of IP limitations. 
Firstly, markets for copyrighted and patented works are not 
perfectly competitive because limiting competition is the raison d’être 
of copyrights and patents.180 Only the owner or her licensees can be 
the legal source of copies of any particular intellectual good. There 
cannot be unfettered competition between different sellers 
competing over price and license terms. Although competition from 
other non-infringing works may still exist, assuming that this 
competition resembles conditions in markets with near-perfect 
 
 178. Compare RADIN, supra note 109, at 172 (arguing that widespread boilerplate 
schemes in which fair use and other user rights are contracted around should be scrutinized 
carefully rather than assumed to be efficient); see also Sag, supra note 171, at 212 (“[R]elying 
exclusively on market mechanisms of exchange creates the danger that strategic exploitation of 
the market system can reduce aggregate welfare.”). 
 179. RADIN, supra note 109, at 169; see also Katz, Substitution, supra note 151, at 144. 
 180. Katz, Making Sense, supra note 51, at 851. 
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competition is conceptually flawed and empirically incorrect; if it 
were true, IP rights would be totally useless.181 
Secondly, even if license terms can be conceived as equivalent to 
product features, the more complex the combination of 
features/terms/prices, the more likely it is that consumers will not 
be capable to fully comprehend on what they are contracting.182 If 
such information gaps and asymmetries exist, the assumption that 
the market functions efficiently becomes less credible.183 While it is 
true that competitors might be interested in bridging the 
information gap in order to increase their own sales at the expense of 
their rivals, competitors may not always find it worth their while to 
bridge the information gap,184 and as noted above, IP law 
intentionally reduces the intensity of competition anyway.185 
Thirdly, even when competition exists and users are fully 
informed about the rights they waive, such transactions may not be 
efficient because the transacting parties will fail to consider the 
externalities imposed on third parties.186 Many users’ rights 
(including copyright subject matter limitations) permit users to 
engage in creative activities that benefit not only the users 
themselves, but also third parties and society at large.187 These users, 
 
 181. Id. at 852. 
 182. RADIN, supra note 109, at 103. 
 183. Id. at 107–08. 
 184. David Gilo & Ariel Porat, Viewing Unconscionability Through a Market Lens, 52 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 133 (2010). 
 185. It should be mentioned that trademark law may also reduce competitors’ ability to 
inform their consumers about the advantages of their products or services over those of their 
rivals. See Ariel Katz, Beyond Search Costs: The Linguistic and Trust Functions of Trademarks, 
2010 BYU L. REV. 1555 (2010). 
 186. Katz, Copyright and Competition, supra note 176, at 214. 
 187. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991); CCH Canadian 
Ltd. v. Law Soc’y of Upper Can., [2004] 1 S.C.R. 339, para. 23 (Can.) (recognizing 
“society’s interest in maintaining a robust public domain that could help foster future creative 
innovation”); see also Théberge v. Galerie d’Art du Petit Champlain Inc., [2002] 2 S.C.R. 336, 
para. 32 (Can.) (“Excessive control by holders of copyrights and other forms of intellectual 
property may unduly limit the ability of the public domain to incorporate and embellish 
creative innovation in the long-term interests of society as a whole, or create practical obstacles 
to proper utilization. This is reflected in the exceptions to copyright infringement enumerated 
in ss. 29 to 32.2, which seek to protect the public domain in traditional ways such as fair 
dealing for the purpose of criticism or review and to add new protections to reflect new 
technology, such as limited computer program reproduction and ‘ephemeral recordings’ in 
connection with live performances.”). 
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however, can expect to internalize only part of the social benefits 
arising from their activities and will not take into account the positive 
spillovers conferred on others.188 For example, a reader may buy a 
book and then decide to write a critique of it, or the book may 
inspire her to write additional works. If that reader has to pay for the 
right to criticize the book or for the right to be inspired by it, her 
willingness to pay will reflect only the private value that she might 
expect to derive from these activities, but not the value that her 
activities will generate to others. Copyright owners ignore those 
positive spillovers as well and would be especially reluctant to permit 
uses that might harm their own interests,189 or they might 
strategically exploit situations of hold-up to extract the highest 
licensing fees possible.190 Consequently, under conditions of full 
alienability of user rights, the market will fail to generate socially 
optimal transactions between owners and users.191 
Lastly, even if first innovators and follow-on innovators could 
internalize all such spillovers, they may still not be able to negotiate 
effectively because of the same information gaps that prevent 
efficient contracting between investors and the earlier innovators 
discussed above.192 Thus, if we cannot assume that conditions for 
Coasian bargaining over first and follow-on innovations exist, there 
is no reason to assume that contracts restricting such follow-on 
innovations are efficient. 
The previous Part challenged the wisdom of making IP remedies 
generally available for enforcing otherwise valid restraints, noting 
that IP owners and their transacting parties may not internalize the 
social costs arising from the long term and in rem nature of IP 
entitlements. It also suggested that enforcing post-sale restraints 
should generally be within the domain of contracts. This Part went 
further and warned against adopting a false Coasian view, namely 
 
 188. Brett M. Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 257, 
262 (2007). 
 189. See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 592 (1995) 
(recognizing that “the unlikelihood that creators of imaginative works will license critical 
reviews or lampoons of their own productions removes such uses from the very notion of a 
potential licensing market”). 
 190. Sag, supra note 171, at 212 (discussing strategic behavior). 
 191. RADIN, supra note 109, at 171. 
 192. See supra notes 170–75 and accompanying text. 
DO NOT DELETE 5/5/2014 3:43 PM 
55 The First Sale Doctrine 
 109 
that contracting around IP limitations is presumptively efficient 
socially. The following Part ties together these two insights, 
specifically in the context of exhaustion and offers a justification for 
the continuing vitality of the first sale doctrine. 
VIII. JUSTIFYING THE FIRST SALE DOCTRINE 
The need for (socially efficient) post-sale restraints arises 
primarily in settings of joint-production and incomplete vertical 
integration. In such cases, working around exhaustion rules is not 
objectionable, at least to the extent that contracting around the rules 
guarantees or improves productive activity (i.e., developing new 
products, producing, and distributing them). In contrast, restraints 
in settings that do not involve joint-production (e.g., those imposed 
on end users or those affecting third parties) result in a different 
cost-benefit calculus. While relying on IP remedies for enforcing 
restraints, which makes such remedies available against end users or 
third parties, might increase the efficacy of the restraint at the margin 
(e.g., contracts may prohibit one distributor to sell in a territory of 
another distributor, but the contract will not prevent a third party 
from buying in one territory and selling in the other), the social costs 
of IP remedies might outweigh this marginal benefit. The reason is 
that post-sale restraints that can be enforced in rem continue to exist 
even when they are no longer justified or would not have been 
justified in the first place.193 Any use that is inconsistent with the 
restraint would require the copyright owner’s permission, but, as I 
have discussed in the previous Part, even if transaction costs would 
not render the pursuit of permission prohibitively costly, information 
asymmetries, strategic behavior, and externalities, all of which are 
endemic in contracting around intellectual goods, suggest that there 
is no reason to presume that contracting around IP limitations will 
be socially efficient. In this Part, I focus on justifying the first sale 
doctrine and argue that it should be treated as a sticky default rule. I 
show that the first sale doctrine improves welfare by reducing 
transaction costs, and I explain why even giving full notice of the 
restraint does not solve the problem, since IP owners and their 
transacting parties will not internalize the full social costs of their 
 
 193. See supra, Part VI.A. 
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transactions and ignore the full benefits that exhaustion permits. 
Proponents of a weak first sale doctrine recognize that at times, 
post-sale restraints could be used anticompetitively, or cause harm to 
innovation, but argue that in such cases antitrust law or the doctrine 
of IP misuse would be sufficient to invalidate them.194 However, 
there are additional types of social costs, both static and dynamic, 
that IP owners and their transacting parties might ignore when they 
want to maximize their respective private benefits, and that antitrust 
law is not designed to address and IP misuse is incapable of 
remedying. The static costs relate to the preservation and resource 
waste of physical objects, and the dynamic costs involve loss of 
knowledge and negative impacts on future innovation, particularly 
user-innovation. 
A. Preservation and Resource Waste 
Copyright owners discontinue a large number of books and 
recordings each year. Of the more than ten thousand books 
published in the United States in 1930, only 174 were still in print 
in 2001.195 In 1999 alone, Barnes and Noble stated that ninety-
thousand books went out of print. Many of these books are shelved 
in public libraries and private domiciles, but few remain in 
publishers’ warehouses.196 Losses in film and music are equally 
dramatic. Only about twenty percent of feature films from the 1920s 
and fifty percent of feature films made prior to 1950 still survive, and 
it is estimated that sixty percent of all sound recordings are now not 
commercially available.197 
While the first sale doctrine cannot be relied on for printing or 
reprinting works that are out of print, it plays an important role in 
mitigating the potential cultural loss associated with works that go 
out of print. Exhaustion rules open up the possibility of a secondary 
 
 194. Hovenkamp, supra note 20, at 541. 
 195. Deirdre K. Mulligan & Jason M. Schultz, Neglecting the National Memory: How 
Copyright Term Extensions Compromise the Development of Digital Archives, 4 J. APP. PRAC. & 
PROCESS 451, 459 (2002). 
 196. Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Can Our Culture Be Saved? The Future of Digital 
Archiving, 91 MINN. L. REV. 989, 1003 (2006). 
 197. Eric Matthew Hinkes, Access Controls in the Digital Era and the Fair Use/First Sale 
Doctrines, 23 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 685, 702 (2006). 
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market and assure that the artifacts embedding protected works 
remain available to the public over time.198 
In addition, exhaustion rules help ensure cultural preservation by 
reducing the opportunity cost and risk of acquiring an intellectual 
work in the first place. Consumers may be more willing to purchase 
an item if they know they can later resell it in a secondary market199 
(e.g., to a used or antiquarian bookseller) without being required to 
obtain the copyright owner’s permission. 
Finally, the first sale doctrine contributes directly to the survival 
of copies of works or patented goods over time by discouraging 
abandonment and waste: instead of discarding an item when keeping 
or preserving it is costly and the item is no longer useful, convenient, 
or economic to keep, the first sale doctrine makes it legal to sell or 
donate a used copy of an intellectual good.200 In short, the first sale 
doctrine enshrines preference for the garage sale over the garbage 
bin and for the library over the landfill. 
In addition to these static benefits, the first sale doctrine 
contributes to dynamic efficiency by permitting secondary market 
channels that enable works and the ideas they carry, or goods and 
the technologies embedded therein, to remain accessible to the 
public even if the copyright holder ceases production or distribution 
of the work.201 It creates a built-in back-up system that ensures 
public access to history, culture, and technology, even if the IP 
holder and the immediate buyer or licensee of her work rationally 
ignore, or strategically choose to negate, this benefit; it preserves the 
public bargain that underlies IP law, even if the private bargain 
between the IP owner and its transacting party ignores it. 
 
 198. R. Anthony Reese, The First Sale Doctrine in the Era of Digital Networks, 44 B.C. L. 
REV. 577, 592 (2003); see generally Diane L. Zimmerman, Cultural Preservation: Fear of 
Drowning in a Licensing Swamp, in WORKING WITHIN THE BOUNDARIES OF INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY (Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Diane L. Zimmerman & Harry First eds., 2010); Hinkes, 
supra note 197, at 685; Margaret Jane Radin, Regulation by Contract, Regulation by Machine, 
160 J. INST. & THEORETICAL ECON. 1 (2004); Zimmerman, supra note 196, at 989. 
 199. Reese, supra note 198, at 607. 
 200. Id. at 607–08. 
 201. Hinkes, supra note 197, at 689. 
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B. Protecting the “Innovation Wetlands” 
Implicit in the debate about exhaustion is the argument that 
whatever benefits IP owners ultimately benefits society because these 
benefits provide greater incentives to create and greater benefits to 
disseminate intellectual goods. An extreme version of this argument 
would be that even if post-sale restraints are imposed for the sole 
reason of increasing the IP owner’s market power, there is nothing 
objectionable about that because the additional profit will benefit 
society in the long run.202 Such a view is consistent with the 
predominantly producer-centric model of innovation. In this model, 
the most important designs or innovations originate from producers 
and are supplied to consumers through the sale of goods and 
services.203 The higher the profit available, the greater is the incentive 
to innovate.204 However, recent research on user innovation 
challenges this nostrum.205 It shows that innovation often occurs 
outside the producer-firm, suggesting that sensible innovation 
policies may require more than just ex ante justification; they must 
also focus on conditions that emerge ex post and protecting the 
“Innovation Wetlands,” a term coined by Andrew Torrance and Eric 
Von Hippel.206 
The producer-centric model of innovation, which dominates 
current debates around IP and antitrust, confronts a moving 
empirical reality. As Eric von Hippel observes, “innovation by 
individual users . . . and . . . open collaborative innovation, are 
 
 202. Cf. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 
398, 407 (2004) (“The mere possession of monopoly power, and the concomitant charging of 
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 203. Carliss Baldwin & Eric von Hippel, Modeling a Paradigm Shift: From Producer 
Innovation to User and Open Collaborative Innovation, 22 ORG. SCI. 1399 (2011). 
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 206. Andrew W. Torrance & Eric von Hippel, Protecting the Right to Innovate: Our 
‘Innovation Wetlands’ 3–4 (Oct. 9, 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2339132 
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modes of innovating that increasingly compete with and may 
displace producer innovation in many parts of the economy.”207 
Thus, there is not a single model of innovation. There are three: one 
driven by producers, one facilitated by users, and one created 
through open collaboration. 
User innovation is driven by lead users having an intention to use 
rather than sell an innovative technology. It arises where design and 
transaction costs are low. The distinguishing characteristic of this 
model is that lead users typically reveal their designs for free, without 
profit motive, at least not an immediate one.208 This makes user 
innovation more desirable over alternative methods of innovation 
when it is technologically feasible; its openness imposes less 
deadweight loss on consumers, while minimizing transaction costs for 
other future producers.209 
Many user innovators are lead users. These users have 
heterogeneous needs not easily satisfied by mass-market 
production.210 Their unique intellectual capital and idiosyncratic 
needs and experiences often allow them to encounter problems and 
devise solutions that no one else can.211 They frequently anticipate 
features that improve products but for which no general demand yet 
exists. Lead users are thus distinguishable from the general consumer 
in that they possess both a need for optimization that impels 
modification of an existing product for their own use and an 
expertise to accomplish this modification.212 The common feature 
among user innovations is that they emerge from many small ideas, 
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obtained through use and manipulation of an asset, over long 
periods of time.213 
If non-producer-centric models of innovation are becoming 
important sources of innovation, then the design of optimal 
exhaustion rules should take into account these other sources of 
innovation. In the case of user innovation, exhaustion fosters such 
innovation because it allows a user who possesses a copy or an 
artifact to experiment with it without the need to obtain permission 
from the IP owners, and it further fosters user innovation because it 
permits users who do not innovate to resell or otherwise transfer the 
goods to users who do innovate.214 
Implied in the view that IP owners should be free to opt out of 
the first sale doctrine is the notion that inventors or authors must be 
able to capture the full social benefit of their innovation for there to 
be adequate incentive to innovate,215 and that unless and until an 
innovator fully internalizes the cost of innovation, he or she will not 
be able to efficiently manage an innovation after it is created.216 The 
implied presumption is that the inventor is the most informed about 
the value of an invention, and that value can be captured fully by the 
transaction price. 
User innovation challenges this thesis because it shows that 
buyers and sellers may have very little idea at the time of invention or 
at the point of sale what innovations will ultimately emerge. If 
innovation is tied to asset use and emerges therefrom, it is impossible 
for the seller to account fully for the asset’s value at the time of sale. 
Few can predict what innovation will follow. Fewer still can predict 
what value such innovation may have for social, cultural, and political 
life.217 The best the seller can do is to price the asset according to a 
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cost-benefit analysis at a static point in time, a time where the 
probabilities of benefits are innately unknowable and will be seriously 
discounted by the seller and the buyer. 
User innovation also implies that knowing who is best able to 
maximize the value of an asset at the time of transaction is unlikely. 
This suggests that the best-informed party, the most capable steward 
of innovation, may be neither the IP owner who imposes the 
restraint nor the firm with which she transacts and accepts the 
restraint. Moreover, the innovator may not even exist when the 
terms of the transaction between the IP owner and its transacting 
parties are negotiated. Therefore, in a truly Coasian way, if we 
cannot tell ex ante who is in the best position to further innovate, 
rules allowing possessors of goods to innovate without restraints 
reduce transaction costs.218 
Restrictions on post-sale use are often attempts by producers to 
internalize or capture as much of the social benefit from an 
innovation as possible through contract or other means.219 But 
attempts to internalize such social benefits necessarily imply limiting 
the flow of spillovers. Contrary to the view that optimal innovation 
requires full-appropriation, there is evidence that the spillovers from 
innovation actually encourage additional innovation.220 Accordingly, 
the most efficient means of fostering innovation may be to allow 
knowledge spillovers by inhibiting post-sale restraints rather than 
allowing them. As Lemley and Frischmann explain, “[i]f a 
technology might be repurposed or improved in ways that the initial  
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innovator is unlikely to foresee, full internalization will interfere with 
the socially optimal development and use of a technology.”221 
 
Figure 2 graphically depicts this assertion. Recognizing that users 
are not only consumers but also actual or potential innovators, 
implies that granting IP owners an extended power (over time and 
distance) to restrain the use of goods embodying their innovation 
will impede users’ ability to innovate, or transfer the goods to others 
who might innovate. A sticky first sale doctrine prevents such 
impedance and preserves freer grounds for future innovation.  
In sum, the first sale doctrine improves welfare by facilitating the 
efficient use of physical and intellectual assets (including human 
capital) both statically and dynamically. However, IP owners and 
their immediate transacting parties may rationally impose and agree 
to restraints that maximize their short-term private benefits, while 
ignoring the short—and long—term externalities that such restraints 
may generate. Full notice of the restraint does not remedy the 
problem, because notice only guarantees more efficient bargaining 
between the transacting parties, but does not account for the 
 
 221. Id. at 278. 
Figure 2 An IP owner, coproducers, and user innovators 
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externalities. If the terms of the transaction between the IP owner 
and her transacting party are unlikely to reflect what is socially 
optimal, contracting around the first sale doctrine should be met 
with a healthy dose of legal skepticism. Therefore, the burden of 
demonstrating the efficiency of the restraints should fall on the 
transacting parties. When the restraints purport to bind third parties 
or have long-term effects, the dose of suspicion should increase. 
IX. APPLICATION 
This Part demonstrates how the framework developed in this 
Article bears on recent cases involving the first sale doctrine. 
A. Costco v. Omega 
Costco v. Omega was a parallel trade case that conforms to the 
paradigmatic international price-discrimination story.222 Costco 
purchased Omega watches, originally sold by Omega to distributors 
in Egypt and Paraguay, from a third-party importer.223 Costco sold 
the watches for $1,300 each instead of the $2,000 suggested retail 
price. Omega sued Costco for copyright infringement.224 The 
copyright in question was in a logo engraved on the back of the 
watch.225 The Ninth Circuit agreed with Omega, holding that the 
first sale doctrine did not apply because under 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) 
the right to resell that copy without the authority of the copyright 
owner is limited to copies “lawfully made under this title,” which the 
court interpreted as lawfully made in the United States.226 Because 
the copies were made outside the United States, the United States 
distribution right had not been exhausted by the authorized foreign 
sales, and the unauthorized importation constituted infringement of 
the copyright.227 
  
 
 222. Omega S.A. v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 541 F.3d 982 (9th Cir. 2008), aff’d by an 
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 223. Id. at 984. 
 224. Id. 
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An equally divided Supreme Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit 
judgment,228 but ultimately Costco prevailed.229 On remand, the 
district court held that Omega’s attempt to prevent parallel 
importation of noncopyrightable watches, by suing the importer for 
unlawfully importing the copyrighted company logo embedded on 
the back of the watch, constituted copyright misuse.230 Moreover, 
the court also decided to award Costco reasonable attorney fees, 
because, among other reasons, Omega’s infringement action “was 
arguably unreasonable and frivolous . . . [and] clearly not one 
properly raised under copyright law.”231 Copyright law “‘serves the 
purpose of enriching the general public through access to creative 
works,’” the court reasoned, but “[b]y affixing a barely perceptible 
copyrighted design to the back of some of its watches, Omega did 
not provide—and did not seek to provide—creative works to the 
general public. Omega sought to exert control over its watches, 
control which it believed it could not otherwise exert.”232 
To some extent, Omega was an easy case for proponents of 
international exhaustion and national exhaustion alike. For 
proponents of international exhaustion, a case like Omega illustrates 
the dangers of national exhaustion, and how a copyright ban on 
parallel imports can be misused to restrain trade in noncopyrightable 
products, such as watches or chocolate bars.233 For proponents of 
national exhaustion, Costco’s happy ending can demonstrate how 
doctrines such as copyright misuse, fair use, or implied license, can 
be relied on to prevent those misuses. In that regard, Omega was 
somewhat of a red herring, deflecting attention away from the real 
dilemma that underlies the tension between international and 
national exhaustion. The Supreme Court would have another 
opportunity to resolve this dilemma in 2013, in Kirtsaeng v. John 
Wiley & Sons.234 
 
 228. Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Omega, S.A., 131 S. Ct. 565 (2010). 
 229. See Omega S.A. v. Costco Wholesale Corp., No. CV 04-05443 TJH, 2011 WL 
8492716, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 9, 2011). 
 230. Id. 
 231. Omega S.A. v. Costco Wholesale Corp., No. CV 04-05443 TJH (RCx), 2012 WL 
3150432, at *1 (C.D. Cal. June 20, 2012). 
 232. Id. (quoting Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 527 (1994)). 
 233. Euro-Excellence Inc. v. Kraft Canada Inc., [2007] 3 S.C.R. 20 (Can.). 
 234. 133 S. Ct. 1351 (2013). 
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B. Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 
Supap Kirtsaeng, a citizen of Thailand, moved to the United 
States in 1997 to study mathematics at Cornell University.235 His 
education was paid for with the help of a Thai government 
scholarship which required him to teach in Thailand for 10 years on 
his return. Kirtsaeng successfully completed his undergraduate 
courses at Cornell and a Ph.D. program in mathematics at the 
University of Southern California, and then returned to Thailand to 
teach. While he was studying in the United States, Kirtsaeng asked 
his friends and family in Thailand to buy copies of foreign edition 
English-language textbooks, which were sold at lower prices at Thai 
book shops, and mail them to him in the United States. He then 
sold them, reimbursed his family and friends, and kept the profit, 
repeating this process over and over.236 
John Wiley & Sons, the publisher of some of these books, 
brought an action for copyright infringement against Kirtsaeng, 
claiming that Kirtsaeng’s unauthorized importation of its books and 
his later resale of those books infringed Wiley’s § 106(3) exclusive 
right to distribute as well as § 602(a)’s related import prohibition.237 
Kirtsaeng replied that the copies that he imported and sold were 
lawfully made and therefore protected under the first sale doctrine. 
The question, therefore, was whether the first sale doctrine, as 
codified in § 109(a), applies to copies that were made abroad. It was 
not disputed that the copies were lawfully made, but like the Ninth 
Circuit in Omega, the lower courts in this case held that “lawfully 
made under this title” meant “lawfully made in the United 
States.”238 
The majority held that § 109(a) does not restrict the scope of the 
first sale doctrine to copies made in the United States, and that the 
doctrine equally applies to copies of a copyrighted work lawfully 
made abroad.239 Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justices Kennedy and 
 
 235. Id. at 1356. 
 236. Id. 
 237. Id. at 1357. 
 238. Id. at 1358 (citing Denbicare U.S.A. Inc., v. Toys “R” Us, Inc., 84 F.3d 1143, 
1149–50 (9th Cir. 1996), abrogated by Kirtsaeng, 133 S. Ct. 1351). 
 239. Id. 
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Scalia, issued a long and passionate dissent. “Instead of adhering to 
the Legislature’s design,” she accused the Court of adopting “an 
interpretation of the Copyright Act at odds with Congress’s aim to 
protect copyright owners against the unauthorized importation of 
low-priced, foreign-made copies of their copyrighted works.”240 She 
characterized the Court’s opinion as a “bold departure from 
Congress’ design [which] is all the more stunning, for it places the 
United States at the vanguard of the movement for ‘international 
exhaustion’ of copyrights—a movement the United States has 
steadfastly resisted on the world stage.”241 
Justice Kagan, joined by Justice Alito, concurred with the 
majority opinion, but intimated that while the first sale doctrine is 
not limited geographically, in enacting § 602(a)(1) Congress 
probably intended “to permit market segmentation, . . . not by 
removing first sale protection from every copy manufactured 
abroad . . . but by enabling the copyright holder to control imports 
even when the first sale doctrine applies . . . .”242 She recognized, 
however, that the Court’s earlier holding in Quality King243 had 
rendered this interpretation impossible.244 
Whether the Court correctly interpreted § 109(a) and § 
602(a)(1) exceeds the scope of this Article. Admittedly, each of the 
interpretations requires some linguistic acrobatics, which probably 
reflects the contentious nature of the issue of parallel imports. I 
would like, however, to offer a few observations. The first relates to 
the immediate issue of parallel imports, and the other comments 
relate to the first sale doctrine more generally. 
The immediate issue in Kirtsaeng was the application of the first 
sale doctrine to copies that were made abroad, and since the case 
involved parallel imports, it was presented as demanding a choice 
between national and international exhaustion, as well as about the 
fate of market segmentation and cross-country price discrimination. 
Notably, however, despite the dissent’s strong conviction that 
Congress intended to implement national exhaustion in order to 
 
 240. Id. at 1373 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 241. Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 242. Id. (Kagan, J., concurring). 
 243. Quality King Distribs., Inc. v. L’anza Research Int’l, Inc., 523 U.S. 135 (1998). 
 244. 133 S. Ct. at 1372 (Kagan, J., concurring). 
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promote market segmentation and price discrimination, the statutory 
hook for that conclusion—the argument that the phrase “made 
under this title” renders the first sale doctrine inapplicable to copies 
made outside the United States—is rather peculiar: what matters for 
market segmentation is not where the copy was made, but where the 
copy was initially distributed.245 Presumably, if Congress were 
unequivocally interested in assisting copyright owners to segment 
markets internationally by legislating a national exhaustion rule, it 
would have done that on the basis of where the copy was sold, not 
on the basis of where it had been made.  
Indeed, a legal rule that treats the circulation of goods differently 
depending on the question of where the copy of a work was made 
may create perverse incentives. Instead of deciding where to produce 
copies on the basis of economic factors, firms may shift production 
of copies abroad in order to gain greater control over the 
downstream distribution of their goods. Whether such control is 
desirable or not, it should be granted or denied regardless of the 
place where the copy was made.246 If Congress clearly intended to 
assist copyright owners to segment international markets by 
preventing parallel imports, it could have done so in a more 
straightforward and elegant way; for example, by adding the word 
“import” in § 106(3). Doing that would have created a clear right of 
importation, which could then be exhausted pursuant to § 109(a), 
all the while being neutral to the location of the copy’s origin (and 
likewise, if Congress clearly intended to adhere to international 
exhaustion, it could have done that easily).247 
Second, the dissent’s proffered rational for favoring national 
exhaustion is the supposed benefits of price discrimination. 
However, as discussed in Part V.C above, even if price discrimination 
is desirable, there is little economic justification to treat domestic 
price discrimination differently from international price 
 
 245. Id. at 1373 n.2. 
 246. Id. 
 247. For example, § 109(a) could read: Notwithstanding the provisions of section 
106(3), the owner of a particular copy or phonorecord that was made with the authority of the 
copyright owner wherever it was made, or any person authorized by such owner, is entitled, 
without the authority of the copyright owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of 
that copy or phonorecord. 
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discrimination. If IP law should be harnessed to enforce price 
discrimination schemes and prevent arbitrage, it makes little sense to 
target only cross-border arbitrage, but deny remedy from all other 
forms of domestic arbitrage. Therefore, the only intellectually 
coherent choice is not between national and international exhaustion, 
but rather between universal exhaustion and no exhaustion at all.248 
Third, the effect of international exhaustion on the extent of 
international market segmentation may be marginal at best. On the 
one hand, in some cases publishers may refrain from price 
discriminating even if the law allows them to prevent arbitrage;249 
and on the other hand, publishers may resort to implement price 
discrimination even if they have no legal recourse against any 
arbitrageur.250 Moreover, parallel imports themselves are a form of 
price discrimination between consumers within the importing 
market, namely those who are willing to pay the ‘official’ high price, 
and those who are not and thus seek a bargain.251 
Furthermore, it is doubtful that a parallel importation enterprise 
such as Kirtsaeng’s can have such a significant impact on sales in the 
United States to prompt any significant change in the publisher’s 
international distribution system. Recall that Mr. Kirtsaeng’s supply 
chain consisted of family and friends who would purchase the books 
in Thailand and ship them to the United States. An operation like 
this can probably be carried on efficiently only on a limited scale, 
beyond which the marginal cost of obtaining additional copies and 
shipping them to the United States is likely to increase very quickly. 
The more general point is that parallel importers operate at a cost 
disadvantage compared to the official distribution system, which caps 
the growth of their operations. 
These observations are consistent with the Court’s holding that 
the fact a publisher may find it more difficult to charge different 
 
 248. See supra Part V.C. 
 249. See Katz, Network Effects, supra note 71, at 181 (explaining that publishers may 
refrain from price discrimination even if arbitrage could be blocked, because information about 
legal copies that are sold elsewhere for a significantly lower price cannot be blocked, and such 
information is a signal that might affect consumers’ preferences and their willingness to pay the 
current higher price). 
 250. Rub, supra note 88, at 45. 
 251. Reza Ahmadi & B. Rachel Yang, Parallel Imports: Challenges from Unauthorized 
Distribution Channels, 19 MARKETING SCI. 279, 279 (2000). 
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prices for the same book in different geographic markets is beside the 
point because there is “no basic principle of copyright law that 
suggests that publishers are especially entitled to such rights.”252 To 
the contrary, the first sale doctrine is a conscious limitation on the 
ability to price discriminate.253 
Kirtsaeng helps illuminate a few of the other points developed 
earlier in this article. It is noteworthy that the entire Court seems to 
have been troubled by the “parade of horribles”—a long list of 
allegedly absurd outcomes that could result from the plaintiff’s 
theory that the first sale doctrine was limited to goods manufactured 
in the United States.254 Indeed, the “parade of horribles” is a 
manifestation of the problem of post-sale restraints that can be 
enforced as property rules, and that continue to encumber products 
in which IP is embedded even when those restraints outlive their 
useful purpose.255 
As Parts VI to VIII demonstrate, while allowing IP owners to 
invoke IP rights to tightly control the distribution of their goods 
may improve the efficiency of their distribution systems, IP remedies 
are not generally essential for achieving such efficiency because 
contractual remedies might be sufficient. It is not enough to show 
that relying on IP remedies is more efficient than relying on 
contractual remedies. To justify the availability of IP remedies it 
must be shown that the marginal benefit of IP remedies over 
contractual remedies outweighs the social cost that is associated with 
IP but lacking with contract. More specifically, there is no basis to 
assume that maintaining an efficient distribution system for 
textbooks requires preventing their free circulation for decades, until 
the copyright therein expires. 
The majority solved the problem by opting for international 
exhaustion, emphasizing the common law (rather than statutory) 
origin of the doctrine, and evincing strong commitment to the 
continuing relevance of the common law’s hostility to restraints on 
alienation.256 
 
 252. Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1351, 1370. (2013). 
 253. Id. at 1371. 
 254. Rub, supra note 88, at 47. 
 255. See supra Part VI.A. 
 256. Kirtsaeng, 133 S. Ct. at 1363. 
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The concurring opinion suggested a partial solution, which 
would give copyright owners the power to prevent unauthorized 
importation, but without imposing downstream liability on those 
who “purchase and resell in the United States copies that happen to 
have been manufactured abroad.”257 This solution prevents the 
absurd outcome that the distribution right never exhausts with 
respect to a copy made abroad, and “would target unauthorized 
importers alone, and not the ‘libraries, used-book dealers, 
technology companies, consumer-goods retailers, and museums’ 
with whom the Court today is rightly concerned.”258 However, while 
Justice Kagan’s solution might prevent some of the specific horribles 
with which the Court was rightly concerned (e.g., the specter that 
libraries would need the copyright owner’s permission for lending a 
foreign made book, or that museums would need to obtain clearance 
before they could display a work of art made abroad), it does not 
eliminate all horribles, because the importation of any work,259 or 
any other product embodying a copy of a work, would still require 
the copyright owner’s permission. Thus, the concerns of used-book 
dealers, technology companies, consumer-goods retailers, and 
museums remain intact. Justice Kagan’s solution might prevent some 
of the horribles attaching to the downstream transfer or use of 
imported copies after they have been circulated in the United 
States—regardless of whether their importation had been authorized 
or not260—but it also means that for the entire duration of the 
 
 257. Id. at 1372–73. 
 258. Id. at 1373. 
 259. Or in the case of libraries, the importation of more than the five copies explicitly 
permitted under 17 U.S.C. § 602(a)(3)(C). 
 260. It is not entirely clear whether Justice Kagan’s solution envisions protection only for 
those who buy and sell copies whose importation was authorized by the copyright owner, or 
anyone who buys or sells such copies in the United States, irrespective of whether their 
importation was lawful or not. If she envisions the latter option, it is not entirely clear that 
such protection would be afforded to them. Selling such copies may be protected under § 109, 
but since under § 501 the importation of such copies is an act of infringement, such copies are 
infringing copies, and it is not entirely clear that the copyright owner does not have any 
recourse against those who possess such infringing copies. In Societe Civile Succession Richard 
Guino v. Int’l Found. for Anticancer Drug Discovery, 460 F. Supp. 2d 1105 (D. Ariz. 2006) 
the court ultimately held that § 503(a) does not authorize the impoundment of infringing 
property purchased by a non-infringing person, but later decisions recognized that this is not 
necessarily a foregone conclusion. See Virtual Studios, Inc. v. Beaulieu Grp., LLC, —— 
F.Supp.2d ——, 2013 WL 6629040, at *10 (E.D.Tenn. 2013). 
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copyright, copyright owners have complete power to prevent those 
copies from entering the United States in the first place. This means 
that the cultural, scientific, and technological choices of Americans 
would be strictly limited to purchasing only those works that are 
commercially available in the United States. Importing any other 
work (including second-hand books, out-of-print books, books in 
foreign language or on niche topics that may be only available 
abroad), or any product embodying such work, would require the 
copyright owner’s permission, even when lawfully made and lawfully 
sold abroad. 
Justice Kagan seems to be sympathetic to the notion that § 
602(a)(1) was indeed designed to give copyright holders greater 
power to segment international markets by restricting importation. 
The problem, however, is that her proposed solution—prohibiting 
any unauthorized importation of lawfully made copies—might 
prevent from entering the United States any copy of a lawfully made 
work even when there is no distribution system that the importation 
might undermine. This would be another example of an IP remedy 
that may be available even when it has outlived its useful purpose.  
The dissent’s solution is interesting, too. While it is adamant that 
Congress unequivocally intended to implement national exhaustion, 
it ignores that if that were the case, Congress did so in a rather 
awkward way—by basing exhaustion on the place of manufacturing 
rather than on the country of first sale. But it also acknowledges 
some of the absurdities arising from this interpretation. To mitigate 
them, the dissent offers two moves: one is the suggestion that 
possible defenses, such as fair use or implied license, may mitigate 
some of the “horribles”;261 the other is the suggestion that the logic 
of Bobbs-Merrill and the common law first sale doctrine can be used 
to apply the first sale doctrine to foreign made copies after their first 
authorized importation into the United States.262 
As I noted above, while doctrines such as fair use, implied 
license, or misuse, can solve some of the problems associated with 
unexhausted restraints, they do not fully solve the problem because 
 
 261. Kirtsaeng, at 1389. 
 262. Id. at 1386–87. 
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they shift the burden of invalidating the restraint on the user.263 I 
believe, however, that the fact that both the majority and the dissent 
confirmed the existence of a common law first sale doctrine whose 
application is not necessarily bound by the text of § 109(a) may 
prove to be an important development that might guarantee the 
doctrine’s continued viability. The anchoring of the first sale 
doctrine in the common law rather than the in the strictures of § 
109(a) might prove important in the case copyrighted works in 
digital form, as it might prevent some problematic refusals of courts 
to apply the doctrine in the context of digital works, such as in the 
following case, Vernor v. Autodesk,264 and Capitol Records v. 
ReDigi,265 discussed later.  
C. Vernor v. Autodesk 
Vernor v. Autodesk involved the resale of used copies of software. 
Timothy Vernor purchased several used copies of Autodesk, Inc.’s 
AutoCAD Release 14 software (“Release 14”) from one of 
Autodesk’s direct customers and then resold the copies on eBay. 
Vernor then brought a declaratory judgment action against Autodesk 
to establish that the resale did not infringe Autodesk’s copyright.266 
Vernor argued that the first sale doctrine permits the sale of those 
used copies.267 The Ninth Circuit disagreed.268 The court reasoned 
that “[i]n its current form, [the first sale doctrine] allows the ‘owner 
of a particular copy’ of a copyrighted work to sell or dispose of his 
copy without the copyright owner’s authorization.”269 The question, 
therefore, was whether Autodesk’s direct customer (who sold the 
 
 263. See supra Part VI.A. 
 264. Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 621 F.3d 1102, 1111 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 265. Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi Inc., 934 F. Supp. 2d 640 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
 266. Vernor, 621 F.3d at 1111. On several earlier occasions, Vernor sought a declaratory 
judgment after Autodesk filed Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”) take-down 
notices with eBay claiming that Vernor’s sale infringed its copyright and eBay terminated 
Vernor’s auctions. Id. at 1105–06. In each of these cases the auctions were reinstated after 
Vernor filed counter-notices and Autodesk failed to respond. Id. At one point, however, eBay 
suspended Vernor’s account for a month because of Autodesk’s repeated allegations of 
infringement, during which Vernor was unable to earn any income from eBay. Id. at 1106. 
 267. Id. at 1106. 
 268. Id. 
 269. Id. at 1107 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2006)). 
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copy to Vernor) was an “‘owner of a particular copy.’”270 The court 
found that the customer was not an owner of the copy, but instead a 
licensee because the Software License Agreement that the customer 
had to accept before installing the software: “(1) specifie[d] that the 
user is granted a license,” while ownership in the copy remained with 
Autodesk; “(2) significantly restrict[ed] the user’s ability to transfer 
the software; and (3) impose[d] notable use restrictions.”271 Finally, 
the court noted “the significant policy considerations raised by the 
parties and amici on both sides of this appeal,”272 but decided that as 
a matter of statutory interpretation and precedent, such 
 
 270. Id. 
 271. Id. at 1111. 
 272. Id. at 1114. For example, Autodesk and its supporters argued that “judicial 
enforcement of software license agreements that restrict transfers of copies of the work” is 
desirable because it “(1) allows for tiered pricing for different software markets, such as 
reduced pricing for students or educational institutions; (2) increases software companies’ 
sales; (3) lowers prices for all consumers by spreading costs among a large number of 
purchasers; and (4) reduces the incidence of piracy by allowing copyright owners to bring 
infringement actions against unauthorized resellers.” Id. at 1114–15. On the other hand, 
Vernor, eBay, and the American Library Association (“ALA”) have presented policy arguments 
against the court’s decision. Id. at 1115. Vernor argued that the decision “(1) does not 
vindicate the law’s aversion to restraints on alienation of personal property; (2) may force 
everyone purchasing copyrighted property to trace the chain of title to ensure that a first sale 
occurred; and (3) ignores the economic realities of the relevant transactions, in which the 
copyright owner permanently released software copies into the stream of commerce without 
expectation of return in exchange for upfront payment of the full software price.” Id. 
Additionally, eBay argued in favor of “a broad view of the first sale doctrine,” which necessarily 
“facilitate[s] the creation of secondary markets for copyrighted works” and “contributes to the 
public good by (1) giving consumers additional opportunities to purchase and sell copyrighted 
works, often at below-retail prices; (2) allowing consumers to obtain copies of works after a 
copyright owner has ceased distribution; and (3) allowing the proliferation of businesses.” Id. 
Moreover, the ALA augmented eBay’s argument by stating “that the first sale doctrine 
facilitates the availability of copyrighted works after their commercial lifespan, by inter alia 
enabling the existence of libraries, used bookstores, and hand-to-hand exchanges of 
copyrighted materials.” Id. It also argued “that judicial enforcement of software license 
agreements, which are often contracts of adhesion, could eliminate the software resale market, 
require used computer sellers to delete legitimate software prior to sale, and increase prices for 
consumers by reducing price competition for software vendors.” Id. In response to Autodesk’s 
arguments, the ALA asserted that were it to be upheld it would “(1) undermine[] 17 U.S.C. § 
109(b)(2), which permits non-profit libraries to lend software for non-commercial purposes, 
and (2) would hamper efforts by non-profits to collect and preserve out-of-print software.” Id. 
The ALA’s position reflects its “fears that the software industry’s licensing practices could be 
adopted by other copyright owners, including book publishers, record labels, and movie 
studios.” Id. 
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considerations should be left to Congress.273 As a result, by requiring 
users to agree to the Software License Agreement, Autodesk was able 
to impose nonexhausting post-sale restraints on copies of its software 
that bind all future users. 
To determine whether this outcome is desirable, it is useful to 
understand what Autodesk tried to achieve by preventing the resale 
of its software. The most likely reason to prevent resale is to create a 
price discrimination scheme. For example, according to the court, 
Autodesk offers the software with different terms for commercial, 
educational institution, and student users.274 Arguably, maintaining 
this scheme requires an ability to prevent arbitrage (e.g., preventing a 
student user from reselling her copy to a commercial user), and 
preventing arbitrage is easier when the unauthorized sale of a 
lawfully-made copy constitutes copyright infringement. 
The case, however, did not involve a student or an educational 
user reselling her copy to a commercial user, but rather dealt with a 
commercial user upgrading his software to a newer version and 
reselling the old one. This raises the possibility that Autodesk sought 
to prevent the resale to maintain another type of price 
discrimination. When Autodesk released AutoCAD Release 15 it 
sold it for $3,750.275 A commercial user new to AutoCAD would 
have to pay this amount if Release 15 was the only suitable software 
for her needs.276 However, an existing user of Release 14 could 
continue using the earlier version even if the new version was better. 
In other words, existing users have more elastic demand for the new 
version than new users. In order to convince existing users to 
upgrade, Autodesk offered them the new version for a substantially 
lower price: $495.277 If the upgrading users could then resell the 
older version to others, Autodesk’s new version would no longer be 
the only game in town. Rather than paying $3,750, a new user 
 
 273. Id. at 1115. 
 274. Id. at 1104. 
 275. Id. at 1105. 
 276. I assume away the availability of competing programs. This assumption is not 
unrealistic, as AutoCAD is currently the de facto standard in this type of programs, with a market share 
of eighty-five percent. See Autodesk (ATSK), WIKINVEST, 
http://www.wikinvest.com/stock/Autodesk_(ADSK) (last visited Feb. 14, 2014). 
 277. Vernor, 621 F.3d at 1105. 
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would have the option of buying a used copy of the older version at 
a low price and then upgrading to Release 15 for Autodesk’s existing 
user price of $495. 
The welfare implications of such a scheme are ambiguous. 
Vernor’s engagement in the resale of used copies indicates that the 
quantity sold and prices set by Autodesk do not satisfy the entire 
demand for AutoCAD (otherwise, there would be no demand for 
the copies sold by Vernor), but it is far from clear that by eliminating 
the secondary market Autodesk will increase output and satisfy this 
demand. Therefore, it is not clear whether allowing Autodesk to 
control the secondary market increases or decreases allocative 
efficiency. There is no clear answer about the effect on dynamic 
efficiency. Evidently, Autodesk’s attempts to eliminate Vernor 
strongly suggest that the secondary market eats into its profit, and 
this can be a bad thing if lower profits reduce the incentive to 
innovate. On the other hand, it is equally possible that competition 
from the secondary market drives Autodesk to keep innovating, 
rather than selling the same version for years until the market is 
fully saturated. 
Further, even if one accepts that Autodesk should be allowed to 
prevent a user who purchases a new version at a lower price from 
reselling the older version, it is not self-evident that it should have 
recourse to anything more than a claim for breach of contract against 
the user. In other words, whatever efficiency restricting the 
immediate user achieves does not automatically justify an ability to 
control all downstream and future resale and does not immediately 
translate into a property right against any subsequent user. Even if 
the existence of a secondary market is problematic, and suing 
secondary market dealers might be more effective than suing 
Autodesk’s own customers,278 the problem is short term, mainly 
during the transition from one version to a newer one. Given that 
permitting Autodesk to design its initial transaction in a way that 
allows it to control any subsequent transaction can have long-term 
 
 278. Interestingly, the decision in Vernor indicates that Autodesk sued not only Vernor 
but also CTA, the customer who sold the copies to Vernor. The parties stipulated to entry of a 
permanent injunction against CTA from directly or contributorily infringing Autodesk’s 
copyrights. There is no mention of any damage award for either breach of contract or 
copyright infringement, suggesting that proving damages had not been easy. 
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and unknown external costs that neither Autodesk nor its immediate 
user internalize, there is a real possibility that a remedy for 
infringement exceeds the problem requiring solution. 
The outcome in Vernor resulted from the court’s literal reading 
of § 109(a), which led it to conclude that the first sale doctrine did 
not apply because the buyer was not an owner of the copy but 
merely a licensee and “[i]n its current form, [the first sale doctrine] 
allows the ‘owner of a particular copy’ of a copyrighted work to sell 
or dispose of his copy without the copyright owner’s 
authorization.”279 That is, for the Ninth Circuit § 109(a) was the 
exclusive basis for the first sale doctrine, and therefore any policy 
consideration should be left to Congress.280 
Prior to Kirtsaeng, this position may be regarded as defensible by 
showing deference to Congress and expressing judicial restraint. 
Post-Kirtsaeng, however, this position may be viewed as a palpable 
error. If, as both the majority and the dissent in Kirtsaeng held, the 
first sale doctrine has a common law component that is not limited 
by the wording of § 109(a), it may be the duty of a court to apply 
the doctrine in a common law fashion and refuse to do that only 
“when a statutory purpose to the contrary is evident.”281 In that 
particular case, Autodesk would bear the burden of showing that 
Congress had intended to permit it to impose a nonexhausting 
restraint on its software products for the duration of the copyright. 
D. UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Augusto 
The last of the recent Ninth Circuit cases involving the first sale 
doctrine is UMG v. Augusto.282 UMG is one the world’s largest 
music companies.283 Like many music companies, UMG ships 
specially produced promotional CDs to a large group of industry 
insiders, such as music critics and radio programmers.284 Many of the 
promotional CDs bear a statement such as the following: 
 
 279. Vernor, 621 F.3d at 1107. 
 280. Id. at 1115. 
 281. Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1351, 1363 (2013). 
 282. UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Augusto, 628 F.3d 1175 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 283. Id. at 1177. 
 284. Id. 
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This CD is the property of the record company and is licensed to 
the intended recipient for personal use only. Acceptance of this CD 
shall constitute an agreement to comply with the terms of the 
license. Resale or transfer of possession is not allowed and may be 
punishable under federal and state laws.285 
Troy Augusto was not a recipient of such CDs but was able to 
obtain numerous promotional CDs that he later sold on eBay.286 
UMG brought an action against Augusto, claiming that selling the 
CDs infringed on its distribution right. The Ninth Circuit affirmed 
the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of 
Augusto.287 The court held that the first sale doctrine applied in 
these circumstances.288 In other words, the distribution of the 
promotional CDs constituted a sale within the meaning of § 109(a) 
of the Copyright Act. As a result, the recipients became owners of 
the copies and were free to dispose of them as they saw fit, and the 
subsequent sale by Augusto did not infringe on UMG’s copyright.289 
In reaching this conclusion, the court distinguished Vernor, finding 
that although UMG placed written restrictions on the labels of the 
CDs, it had not established that the restrictions on the CDs created a 
license agreement rather than a sale.290 
Unlike Costco, Kirtsaeng, or Vernor, UMG v. Augusto does not 
seem to be a case of price discrimination. The promotional CDs are 
sent to industry insiders before the CDs are released for purposes of 
promoting and advertising the release of the new CD. The 
promotional CDs are similar but not equal to the new CDs, as they 
may contain fewer songs and may not include the artwork included 
with the new CDs.291 
Augusto is a case that gets very close to being one that may 
actually justify the restraints that UMG attempted to impose on the 
 
 285. Id. 
 286. Id. 
 287. Id. at 1183. 
 288. Id. at 1177. 
 289. Id. at 1180. 
 290. Id. at 1181. The court also found that the recipients were free to dispose of them as 
they saw fit under the Unordered Merchandise Statute, 39 U.S.C. § 3009. 
 291. UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Augusto, 558 F. Supp. 2d 1055, 1058 (C.D. Cal. 2008), 
aff’d, 628 F.3d 1175 (9th Cir. 2011). 
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recipients of the promotional CDs. The key difference between 
Augusto and a case like Vernor is that the promotional CDs are sent 
before the new CDs are released. The difference is crucial because the 
insiders receiving the CDs are not ordinary consumers. In fact, those 
insiders can be regarded as coproducers or collaborators, at least to 
some extent. 
Playing songs remains the most effective means for promoting 
new musical artists, and radio stations play a crucial role in creating 
and shaping the demand for new songs.292 The relationships between 
record companies and insiders who receive the promotional CDs are 
symbiotic. Feedback received from insiders can be important for 
making any last decisions before the release of a new CD, and the 
timing and manner in which the promotional CDs are distributed 
provide important signals to insiders about the promotional efforts 
the record company intends to exert. These signals help radio 
stations better forecast the changing tastes of their listeners.293 But 
sending the promotional CDs involves risks. For example, premature 
leaks may undermine carefully planned scheduling surrounding the 
release of new CDs or may release materials that might not 
ultimately be included in the released disk.294 All of this suggests that 
there are legitimate reasons for restraining the free distribution of 
promotional CDs, at least temporarily. 
But the temporal issue is crucial.295 Even if contractual 
obligations may not be sufficient to guarantee optimal control when 
it is necessary, UMG’s notice and legal theory is overkill. The notice 
on the promotional CDs indiscriminately prohibited any sale or 
transfer of possession, even transfers occurring long after the reasons 
justifying the restrictions no longer exist, and even by people who 
cannot be regarded as coproducers in any way. The promotional 
CDs are valuable for some collectors, and they may be valuable in 
 
 292. Ariel Katz, The Potential Demise of Another Natural Monopoly: Rethinking the 
Collective Administration of Performing Rights, 1 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 541, 583 
(2005); Brief for Amicus Curiae Recording Industry Association of America in Support of 
Reversal at 7, UMG Recordings, 628 F.3d 1175 (No. 08-55998) [hereinafter RIAA Brief]. 
 293. PETER M. THALL, WHAT THEY’LL NEVER TELL YOU ABOUT THE MUSIC BUSINESS 
135 (2006). 
 294. RIAA Brief, supra note 292, at 10. 
 295. Cf. Katz, Substitution, supra note 151, at 140–47. 
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the future for researchers, or for other purposes that is presently 
unknown and unknowable. The first sale doctrine permits the free 
circulation of such CDs and thereby contributes to the preservation 
of such promotional CDs, which may be socially valuable in the 
long run. 
E. Capitol Records v. ReDigi 
Capitol Records v. ReDigi296 dealt with the application of the first 
sale doctrine to works in digital form. Capitol Records brought 
action against ReDigi, a website operator, alleging that ReDigi’s 
service, which allowed individuals to resell digital music files that 
were lawfully purchased on iTunes, amounted to copyright 
infringement. The district court described the dispute as “a 
fundamental clash over culture, policy, and copyright law,” but 
declared that “[b]ecause this is a court of law and not a 
congressional subcommittee or technology blog, the issues are 
narrow, technical, and purely legal.”297 It ruled in favor of the record 
company, while rejecting ReDigi’s legal and policy arguments, 
noting that it was left for Congress to deem the limitations on the 
applicability of the first sale doctrine to digital goods outmoded, not 
for the court.298 
ReDigi’s service permitted individuals who purchased songs on 
iTunes to resell them, describing itself as “a ‘virtual’ marketplace for 
‘pre-owned’ digital music.”299 ReDigi attempted to configure its 
service in such a way that the sale of the music files would not 
involve multiplication of copies. It asserted that its process 
“involve[d] ‘migrating’ a user’s file, packet by packet—’analogous to 
a train’—from the user’s computer to the Cloud Locker so that data 
does not exist in two places at any one time.”300 It hoped that this 
way, its activities would be considered a transfer of possession of 
copies—permitted under the first sale doctrine—rather than a 
reproduction of the work, which the first sale doctrine does not 
 
 296. Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi Inc., 934 F. Supp. 2d 640 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
 297. Id. at 645. 
 298. Id. at 656. 
 299. Id. at 645. 
 300. Id. 
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allow. The court disagreed. It held that “the plain text of the 
Copyright Act makes clear that reproduction occurs when a 
copyrighted work is fixed in a new material object.”301 In the court’s 
view, the crucial feature of a reproduction is the fixation of the work 
in a new material object, whether or not multiplication of 
copies exists.302 
This holding proved fatal to ReDigi first sale defense, because 
according to the court, the first sale doctrine was “limited to 
assertions of the distribution right. [But] [b]ecause the Court has 
concluded that ReDigi’s service violates Capitol’s reproduction right, 
the first sale defense does not apply to ReDigi’s infringement of 
those rights.”303 The court also found § 109(a) was inapplicable 
because “as an unlawful reproduction, a digital music file sold on 
ReDigi is not ‘lawfully made under this title.’”304 Finally, “the statute 
protects only distribution by ‘the owner of a particular copy or 
phonorecord . . . of that copy or phonorecord. . . . [but] [h]ere, a 
ReDigi user owns the phonorecord that was created when she 
purchased and downloaded a song from iTunes to her hard disk. But 
to sell that song on ReDigi, she must produce a new phonorecord 
on the ReDigi server. Because it is therefore impossible for the user 
to sell her ‘particular’ phonorecord on ReDigi, the first sale statute 
cannot provide a defense.”305 In the court’s view, “the first sale 
defense is limited to material items, like records, that the copyright 
owner put into the stream of commerce.” 
While the court gave a nod to ReDigi’s “attractive policy 
argument,” namely the argument that “refusal to apply the first sale 
doctrine to its service would grant Capitol “a Court sanctioned 
extension of rights under the [C]opyright [A]ct . . . which is against 
policy, and should not be endorsed by this Court,” the court 
dismissed them as irrelevant in light of Congress’s choice to limit the 
first sale doctrine to the lawful owner’s “particular” phonorecord. 
Accepting ReDigi’s argument would, in the eyes of the court, 
amount to an amendment of the Copyright Act, which “is a 
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legislative prerogative that courts are unauthorized and ill-suited 
to attempt.”306 
Nevertheless, the court did not shy away from relying on policy 
argument to reject ReDigi’s arguments and endorse Capitol’s. When 
rejecting the argument that its reading of § 109(a) “would in effect 
exclude digital works from the meaning of the statute,”307 the court 
explained that § 109(a) “still protects a lawful owner’s sale of her 
‘particular’ phonorecord, be it a computer hard disk, iPod, or other 
memory device onto which the file was originally downloaded.” The 
court acknowledged that this view of the first sale doctrine “clearly 
presents obstacles to resale that are different from, and perhaps even 
more onerous than, those involved in the resale of CDs and 
cassettes,” but noted that “the limitation is hardly absurd—the first 
sale doctrine was enacted in a world where the ease and speed of data 
transfer could not have been imagined.”308 In reaching this 
conclusion, the court relied on a 2001 Unites States Copyright 
Office Report stating that the first sale doctrine should not apply to 
the distribution of digital works because “[t]he ability of such ‘used’ 
copies to compete for market share with new copies is thus far 
greater in the digital world.”309 The reason for that being that unlike 
physical copies of works which degrade with time and use, digital 
information does not degrade, and “[t]he ‘used’ copy is just as 
desirable as (in fact, is indistinguishable from) a new copy of the 
same work.”310 And since “[t]ime, space, effort and cost no longer 
act as barriers to the movement of [digital] copies . . . [the] natural 
brake on the effect of resales on the copyright owner’s market, no 
longer exists in the realm of digital transmissions.”311 
Like many of the arguments favoring no, or a very weak, first sale 
doctrine, this argument focuses on the short-term benefits that may 
accrue to copyright owners if the doctrine could be eliminated, while 
ignoring the resulting the long-term harms to the public. Even if a 
 
 306. Id. 
 307. Id. at 656. 
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 309. Id. (quoting U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, DIGITAL 
MILLENNIUM COPYRIGHT ACT REPORT, § 104 (2001) [hereinafter DMCA Report]). 
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“used” copy is functionally indistinguishable from the “original” 
copy, it is not clear why it is necessarily a public policy problem that 
requires a legal solution.312 It can be a problem for the copyright 
owner who wants to price discriminate, and the availability of 
cheaper “used” copies undermines its ability to do that, but at the 
same time, the ability to resell copies may increase some buyers’ 
willingness to pay a higher price for the original in the first place. 
Importantly, the Copyright Office’s argument ignores that unlike the 
case of unauthorized reproduction that increases the supply of 
copies, the first sale does not change the quantum of copies that are 
circulating: “used” copies are available only because the copyright 
owner has already sold them in the first place. This is not to say that 
applying the first sale doctrine to digital works may not pose 
challenges to copyright owners, but it is far from obvious that those 
challenges are insurmountable to the point of justifying the 
doctrine’s abolition. Whatever those challenges are, they may tend to 
concentrate during or around the time of production and initial 
distribution and diminish over time, as described above. Like all 
other reasons that may justify post-sale restraints, the challenges 
arising from the distribution of digital works may justify some short-
term contractual or organizational solutions, but it is far from 
obvious that they justify burdening digital works with restraints on 
their alienation lasting the entire duration of the copyright. 
F. Summary 
Like the Ninth Circuit in Vernor and Omega, ReDigi relied 
exclusively on the statutory language of § 109(a).313 This is 
regrettable. ReDigi was decided on March 30, 2013, merely eleven 
days after Kirtsaeng, and even though the ruling cites Kirtsaeng, it 
ignored what might be the most important lesson from that case, 
namely that the first sale doctrine’s common law roots and the policy 
that underlies it may compel its application beyond the scope 
of § 109(a). 
 
 312. It should be noted that a “used” digital copy is not always a functional equivalent to 
an original. For example, books, movies, or music albums, may serve as popular gifts. But 
giving another person a “used” copy may look cheap and undermine some of the social 
significance of the act of gift giving. 
 313. See supra, text accompanying note 305. 
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In fact, had the court in ReDigi appreciated the full meaning of 
Kirtsaeng, it would have been open to decide the case differently. 
Justice Breyer’s invocation of Lord Coke’s seventeenth century 
writing, rather than being arcane, invites, or indeed compels, a 
refreshing appreciation of the first sale doctrine, including in its 
application to digital goods. Lord Coke’s words, as cited by Justice 
Breyer, are worth reproducing here: 
[If] a man be possessed of . . . a horse, or of any other chattell . . . 
and give or sell his whole interest . . . therein upon condition that 
the Donee or Vendee shall not alien[ate] the same, the [condition] 
is voi[d], because his whole interest . . . is out of him, so as he hath 
no possibilit[y] of a Reverter, and it is against Trade and Traffi[c], 
and bargaining and contracting betwee[n] man and man: and it is 
within the reason of our Author that it should ouster him of all 
power given to him.314 
The ruling in ReDigi is preoccupied with “thingness.” Its 
holding that the reproduction right had been infringed was “of 
course, confirmed by the laws of physics. It is simply impossible that 
the same ‘material object’ can be transferred over the Internet.”315 
Similarly, the first sale doctrine applies only to the transfer of the 
“particular” copy or phonorecord. Thus, it “still protects a lawful 
owner’s sale of her ‘particular’ phonorecord, be it a computer hard 
disk, iPod, or other memory device onto which the file was originally 
downloaded,” but not the transfer of the digital file apart from the 
physical thing in which it is embedded. Thus, it ignores one of the 
most important insights of modern legal thought, namely that “the 
institution of property is not concerned with scarce resources 
themselves (‘things’), but rather with the rights of persons with 
respect to such resources,”316 and it ignores that having copyright in 
a work means that the copyright owner has “has certain rights with 
respect to reproduction [and specific other uses] of [that work], and 
that these rights are separate and distinct from the rights that exist 
with respect to particular physical copies of the [work].”317 
 
 314. Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1351, 1363 (2013). 
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What Justice Breyer, via the quote from Coke, reminds us is that 
the legal significance of a sale of a horse, a book, or any other chattel 
lies not in the transfer of the horse or the book, but in the transfer of 
the seller’s interest in them: it is about the transfer of one’s legal 
interest with respect to the horse or the book, rather than the 
transfer of the horse or the book itself. 
Thus, when a person buys a song from iTunes, what the person 
receives, from a legal standpoint, is not a “thing” but permission to 
do certain acts that prior to the transaction it did not have the right 
to do, for example, making a reproduction of the digital file on the 
buyer’s computer and on five additional devices.318 A digital first sale 
doctrine, therefore, means that the buyer transfers her use privilege 
to another person, and thereby deprives herself thereof. Like a 
reseller of a book, who transfers her interest in the particular copy to 
the buyer, the reseller of a digital song or a digital book, transfers her 
use privileges to another. Focusing on the transfer of one’s rights 
with respect to a resource, be it a horse, book, CD, iTunes song, or 
e-book, rather than the transfer of the resource-thing, renders the 
difference between the book and the ebook meaningless. The court 
in ReDigi might have felt constrained by the statutory language of § 
109(a), but had it appreciated the deeper meaning of the holding in 
Kirtsaeng, it might have realized that what ReDigi did was helping 
individuals who wanted to transfer the set of privileges that they had 
lawfully obtained (permission to download a song, make a specified 
number of additional reproductions, etc.) to another person. Those 
individuals did not buy a ‘particular’ copy, but paid for, and 
consequently owned, a set of privileges to make certain non-
particular copies. ReDigi helped them transfer that set of privileges 
to another person. As codified, the first sale doctrine may refer to the 
transfer of particular owned copies, but the common law principle 
that the Congress codified but not abrogated is not so limited.  
It may be argued that a digital first sale may still go the way of 
the dodo because copyright owners (or their authorized resellers) 
 
 318. iTunes Store, Terms and Conditions, APPLE, available at 
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may characterize their transactions as licensing transactions rather 
than sales, and further stipulate that the license is nontransferable.319 
But the question is not whether they would attempt to do so, but 
whether the law ought to uphold those attempts. Surely, the 
seventeen century man who possessed the horse and gave or sold his 
whole interest therein upon condition that the Donee or Vendee 
shall not alienate the horse, preferred giving or selling an 
encumbered horse over giving or selling a nonencumbered one. And 
presumably, the person who accepted receiving the encumbered 
horse might have found the condition acceptable or even attractive 
(e.g., if the price were lower). Similarly, the Bobbs-Merrill Company 
preferred to sell books and maintain their resale prices downstream, 
some booksellers were happy to accept those terms, and John Wiley 
& Sons preferred that the books that it sold in Thailand would not 
be imported to the United States.  
However, notwithstanding the desire of the owner of the horse 
or the copyright owner in the book to impose such post-sale 
restraints on alienation, Lord Coke, Justice Day and Justice Breyer 
have all declined to include such power in the owners’ bundle of 
rights, because recognizing such power might lead to parades of 
horribles, or externalities, which the owners—as well as their 
immediate transacting parties—would rationally ignore. Recognizing 
such power, in Coke’s words, would be “against Trade and Traffi[c], 
and bargaining and contracting.” As Justice Breyer held, “[a] law 
that permits a copyright holder to control the resale or other 
disposition of a chattel once sold is similarly ‘against Trade and 
Traffi[c], and bargaining and contracting’ . . . [because] [w]ith these 
last few words, Coke emphasizes the importance of leaving buyers of 
goods free to compete with each other when reselling or otherwise 
disposing of those goods.”320 This rationale holds true to digital 
goods as well. Therefore, the fact that copyright owners (or their 
authorized resellers) might prefer characterizing their digital 
transactions as the grant of nontransferable licenses in order to 
impose post-sale restraints does not determine the fate of the first 
sale doctrine. The question is whether the law, which has consciously 
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and consistently declined to give them such power, ought to change 
its mind with respect to digital copies. 
In all of the cases discussed in this Part, copyright owners might 
have had plausibly legitimate reasons to be interested in imposing 
post-sale restraints. I say “plausibly legitimate” reasons to indicate 
that the restraint seems to have been designed to advance a goal that 
is not plainly anticompetitive and might even be procompetitive, and 
to distinguish those cases from a case such as Bobbs-Merrill in which 
the restraint was the means to enforce an industry-wide cartel.321 
From an antitrust perspective, the distinction is crucial: while 
modern antitrust law may treat the latter as per se illegal, not only 
will it not necessarily condemn the former type of restraints, it might 
even embrace them. But the insight that post-sale restraints may be 
efficient, an insight that has been crucial to the maturity of antitrust 
law, does not automatically translate into a pseudo-equivalent IP rule 
that allows IP owners to adopt post-sale restraints in a manner that 
would be binding everyone. 
All that the insights from modern antitrust teach is that when 
firms jointly participate in a productive enterprise that is prone to 
opportunism, various enforceable restrictions may be necessary, as 
stated in Proposition 2, which is why agreements implementing such 
restraints are no longer treated as per se unlawful. But as Proposition 
3 states, the economics of joint production do not normally justify 
enforceable long-lasting post-sale restraints or restraints imposed on 
third parties. Therefore, enforcing post-sale restraints should not 
normally be part of the property bundle. Indeed, it is far from 
obvious that the benefits of those restraints could not be mostly 
achieved through other means, and in any event it is hard to see how 
any of the claimed benefits and proffered justifications in any of these 
cases would justify burdening the works with nonexhausted 
restraints, enforceable in rem, for the entire duration of the 
copyright term. Since copyright owners and their immediate 
transacting parties do not internalize the social harms that such long-
lasting restraints impose, the “parade of horribles” that they may 
create is not a speculative outcome, but a probable one. 
  
 
 321. See supra, Part III.A. 
DO NOT DELETE 5/5/2014 3:43 PM 
55 The First Sale Doctrine 
 141 
 
Therefore, as stated in Proposition 4, working around the first 
sale doctrine should be presumptively invalid. Courts should refuse 
to enforce license conditions or contract terms limiting the ability of 
the user to resell goods embodying IP rights unless the IP owner can 
demonstrate that the restraint is necessary and superior to other means 
to achieve efficiency. 
Lord Coke surely had not read Coase, but his conclusion that 
restraints on alienation are “against Trade and Traffi[c], and 
bargaining and contracting betwee[n] man and man”322 is no 
less wise. 
X. CONCLUSION 
Despite over a hundred years of adjudication, courts have never 
been able to draw the exact contours of the first sale doctrine or fully 
articulate its rationale. Recently, insights borrowed from modern 
antitrust law and economics have been invoked to provide a 
seemingly robust theoretical foundation for undermining exhaustion 
rules or narrowing their scope, thereby strengthening IP owners’ 
control over downstream distribution and use of the goods they 
produce. It has been suggested that just as antitrust law has 
recognized the efficiency of post-sale restraints and relaxed its 
hostility toward them, so should IP law permit their imposition and 
provide remedies for their breach. This Article shows that, with the 
exception of certain instances, this trend is misguided and should be 
resisted, not because the insights from modern antitrust are 
irrelevant, but because insights from modern antitrust do not 
support the case against the first sale doctrine. The main benefits of 
post-sale restraints involve situations of imperfect vertical integration 
between coproducing or collaborating firms, and those benefits 
occur during the production and distribution phases or shortly 
thereafter. In such situations, contracting around the first sale 
doctrine should be permitted, and agreements containing such 
restraints should not be automatically condemned. Beyond such 
limited circumstances, however, the first sale doctrine promotes 
important social and economic goals: it promotes efficient use of 
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goods embodying IP, guarantees their preservation, and facilitates 
user innovation, while minimizing transaction costs that otherwise 
might impede those goals. When a closer look is taken at what 
modern antitrust law can teach, it can be seen that it confirms the 
validity and supports the continued vitality of the first sale doctrine. 
 
